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On the Origins of Originalism
Jamal Greene†
Abstract
For all its proponents’ claims of its necessity as a means of 
constraining judges, originalism is remarkably unpopular outside the United 
States. Recommended responses to judicial activism in other countries more 
typically take the form of minimalism or textualism. This Article considers why. I 
focus particular attention on the political and constitutional histories of Canada 
and Australia, nations that, like the United States, have well-established 
traditions of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with the 
United States a common-law adjudicative norm, but whose judicial cultures less 
readily assimilate judicial restraint to constitutional historicism. I offer six 
hypotheses as to the influences that sensitize our popular and judicial culture to 
such historicism: the canonizing influence of time; the revolutionary character of 
American sovereignty; the rights revolution of the Warren and Burger Courts; the 
politicization of the judicial nomination process in the United States; the 
accommodation of an assimilative, as against a pluralist, ethos; and a relatively 
evangelical religious culture. These six hypotheses suggest, among other things, 
that originalist argument in the United States is a form of ethical argument, and 
that the domestic debate over originalism should be understood in ethical terms.
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For the last quarter-century originalism has been the idiom of judicial 
restraint in the United States. Originalism’s proponents defend it as uniquely 
appropriate to judging in a constitutional democracy because, unlike its 
competitors, originalism offers articulable and transparent criteria for discerning 
the meaning of ambiguous constitutional texts. Without the discipline originalism 
enforces, judges are free to decide cases according to metrics that are either 
impermissible—their naked policy preferences, say—or too opaque to impose the 
public accountability the judicial role demands.
Despite sustained criticism that has discredited originalists within certain 
corners of the legal academy, the originalism movement is a success by numerous 
measures.1 As others have remarked, the Court’s recent decision in 
2 was less interesting for its result, which was widely 
anticipated, than for the fact that Justice Stevens’s lengthy dissent spent so much 
space parsing the views of eighteenth-century Americans on the meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s text.3 As Part II of this Article details, originalism is a 
recurring topic of discussion in newspaper editorials, on blogs, on talk radio, and 
at confirmation hearings, and consistently large numbers of Americans report in 
surveys that they believe Supreme Court Justices should interpret the Constitution 
solely based on the original intentions of its authors.4
In light of the claims to singular democratic legitimacy made on 
originalism’s behalf, and given the evident sympathies of many Americans 
toward those claims, it is curious that originalism is so little celebrated outside the 
United States. The notion that the meaning of a political constitution is fixed at 
some point in the past and is authoritative in present cases is pooh-poohed by 
most leading jurists in Canada, South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of 
                                                  
1 Jamal Greene, , 97 GEORGETOWN L.J. 657 (2009).
2 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (establishing an individual constitutional right to keep a loaded handgun 
in one’s home).
3 . at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cass R. Sunstein, : 
Heller Griswold, 122 HAR V. L. REV. 246, 250 (2008); on a First Read, Posting of Dale 
Carpenter to the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008 
5:03 p.m. EST); Some Preliminary Reflections on Heller, Posting of Sandy Levinson to 
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/some-preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html 
(June 26, 2008 5:47 p.m. EST); More on Heller, Posting of Mark Tushnet to Balkinization, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/more-on-heller.html (June 27, 2008 9:57 a.m. EST); . 
Greene, note 1, at 686-88 (noting that Justice Stevens’s opinion was not originalist in the 
same sense as Justice Scalia’s).
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Europe, and the text-bound “original meaning” version of originalism that has
been ascendant in recent years in the United States is on the wane in Australia.
The global rejection of American-style originalism would be 
understandable if constitutional judges in other democratic countries either were 
ignorant of originalism’s claims to judicial restraint or were discouraged from 
such restraint altogether, but neither is true. The charge of judicial activism is 
neither unique to nor uniquely stigmatic within American constitutional 
discourse,5 and for all the hostility many originalists show toward importing 
foreign jurisprudence into American constitutional interpretation, the domestic 
originalism movement has not been reticent in seeking to export itself abroad.6
That so many American judges, theorists, and ordinary citizens take originalism 
so seriously seems all the more curious in light of the advanced age of the U.S. 
Constitution. Few constitutional framers or ratifiers are less connected to 
contemporary realities than our own, and yet few peoples more earnestly or 
enthusiastically engage originalist constitutional premises than we do. It may be 
the genius of the U.S. Constitution that its text so graciously adapts to changing 
circumstances,7 but it is a genius that many originalists conspicuously refuse to 
recognize.
Our relative embrace of originalism is not easily explained as a corollary 
either to the age of our Constitution, which at first blush seems to cut the other 
way, or its commitment to writing, which is no longer unique. Nor do we find 
obvious answers in our politics. Rights revolutions of the sort that the originalism 
movement is responsive to have proceeded more quickly and more dramatically 
elsewhere, and yet opposition movements in those societies have not turned to 
historical meaning as a source of constitutional restoration.8 Foreign legal cultures 
tend rather to express objections to judicially engineered constitutional change in 
terms of either minimalism or legalism, recalling the erstwhile American 
alternatives of prudentialism and “neutral principles.”9
                                                  
5 , KEN T RO ACH, THE SUPREME COUR T ON TR IAL: JUD ICIAL AC TIVISM OR DEMOCR ATIC 
DIALOGUE? (2001); Elke Luise Barnstedt, 
, 13 JURIDIC A IN T’L 38 (2007); Michael 
Kirby, , 24 AUSTR. BAR REV. 1 (2004).
6 note 67 and accompanying text; . Greg Craven, 
, 1 PUB. L. REV. 166, 166 (1990) (“No one with 
a serious interest in constitutional law and theory could fail to be aware of the debate that has 
raged in the United States over the question of ‘original intent’ (or ‘intentionalism’) as a theory for 
the interpretation of that country’s Constitution.”).
7 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
8 Jack M. Balkin, , 24 CONST. COMM . 427, 506 
(2007).
9 ALEX ANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BR ANCH 111-98 (1962), Herbert 
Wechsler, , 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
See, e.g.
Judicial Activism in the Practice of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court: Is the GFCC an Activist Court?
Judicial Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation
See infra cf Original Intent and the Australian 
Constitution—Coming Soon to a Court Near You?
See
See Originalism and Constitutional Redemption
Compare with
Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law
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This all raises a strong inference that originalism is not culturally neutral; 
that is, whether originalism “takes” appears to depend less on than on . If true, 
recognition that affinity for originalism is culturally contingent could have two 
salutary effects. First, it could go some way toward debunking the claim, still 
advanced by many of originalism’s defenders, that originalist interpretation 
inheres in judicially enforced written constitutionalism. Second, it could go even 
further toward determining the best use of the considerable energy now devoted 
either to originalism’s defeat or to its appropriation for progressive ends.
Turning the inference into a conclusion is challenging, however. We have 
no access to a parallel-universe United States in which most relevant variables 
save an embrace of originalism are held constant. Nonetheless, we do have, in 
Canada and Australia, two foreign legal regimes that are in many key respects 
comparable to our own.10 Like the United States, Canada and Australia are stable, 
liberal democracies with independent judiciaries, well-established traditions of 
judicial review, and written constitutions of long standing relative to most of the 
world’s. Moreover, all three countries have common-law legal regimes derived 
from British practice, and so seem more likely than civil-law countries to 
approach statutory and constitutional interpretation using the evolutionary and 
judge-empowering methods generally disfavored by originalists.11 Any 
explanations for divergence between American attitudes toward constitutional 
historicism and those of Canadians and Australians cannot readily count on the 
“writtenness” of the U.S. Constitution, its enforcement by independent and 
unaccountable judges, or the necessity of checking a judiciary accustomed to the 
creativity that common-law adjudication affords.
As Part III demonstrates, in neither Canada nor Australia is the language 
of judicial restraint historicist. In Canada, the metaphor of a “living tree” 
dominates constitutional judicial practice and scholarship; objections to “activist” 
decisions are more typically framed as errors of application than errors of method. 
As in much of Europe, Canadian constitutional interpretation is unapologetically, 
and for the most part uncontroversially, teleological. The same cannot be said of 
Australia, whose constitutional jurisprudence is self-consciously “originalist” to a 
degree unknown in the United States and unimaginable in Canada. Significantly, 
                                                  
10 Here, then, I employ a “most similar cases” approach to comparative constitutional law. Ran 
Hirschl, , 53 AM . J. COMP . L.
125 (2005).
11 AN TONIN SC ALIA, , A MATTER  OF 
IN TERPRETATION: FEDER AL COUR TS AND  THE LAW 40 (1997); Michel Rosenfeld, 
, 2 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 633, 655 (2004) (“[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty in the United States stems less 
from the judicial vindication of antimajoritarian rights than from the danger that judges, nurtured 
on the broad and open-ended common-law approach, will trample on majoritarian laws much 
more than is constitutionally necessary.”).
it us
See
The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law
See Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System in
see also
Constitutional Adjudication in the United States and Europe: Paradoxes and Contrasts
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however, Australia’s judges, lawyers, and theorists are less likely than their 
American counterparts to marry constitutional historicism to judicial restraint. 
Rather, Australian originalism has for many years been aggressively textualist. In 
some, perhaps most cases, the end result is attention to the original understanding 
of constitutional provisions. But Australian jurists are generally comfortable 
incorporating contemporary norms, even those given authoritative voice only in 
foreign jurisdictions or international legal instruments, into interpretation of open-
ended textual provisions. Few would doubt, moreover, that the secular trend in 
Australian constitutionalism is toward greater attention to constitutional purpose 
and away from the public-meaning originalism promoted by Justice Scalia and by 
most academic originalists in the United States. In short, although some version of 
originalist judicial practice is hardly peculiar to the United States, the historicist 
appeals that support American originalism have a potency that few foreign 
constitutional courts can match, not the least the two most like our own. 
It is not possible, of course, to establish conclusively what produces this 
result. An uncountable number of factors determine the sorts of interpretive 
moves that prove persuasive and become conventional within a legal culture; one 
must admit a certain risk in reaching conclusions based on considered but 
ultimately anecdotal observation of political histories. It is equally obvious, 
however, that such observation strongly recommends a set of hypotheses that 
usefully informs the American debate over originalism.
Part IV considers six such hypotheses. First is the effect that the passage 
of time has over our tendencies to lionize historical figures and cohorts. Even if 
we cannot expect Madison to understand our world, his imprimatur is worth more 
than that of the “rascals” who currently populate our politics. Moreover, the fact 
that in principle we have yet to scrap our Constitution inevitably breeds a certain 
confidence in the correctness of its original assumptions.
Second, and in aid of the first, our Constitution is perceived as
revolutionary rather than evolutionary. The United States announced its 
sovereignty quickly, painfully, and without sympathy to its former colonizers. A 
political identity so formed is not easily refashioned in light of evolving 
contemporary circumstances, at least not overtly. The sovereign “moments” of 
Canada and Australia were glacial by comparison; although both countries had 
functional constitutions by the start of the twentieth century, Canada’s could not 
be amended domestically until 1982 and both countries were to varying degrees 
formally bound by British Crown well into the 1980s.
Third, American originalism is an instrument through which a domestic 
sociopolitical movement seeks to influence our courts. If that movement is a 
backlash against the rights-affinity of the Warren and Burger Courts,12 there is 
                                                  
12 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe , 42 
HAR V. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); Greene, note 1, at 674-82.
See Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash
supra
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little reason to expect a counterpart to emerge organically from different political 
conditions in other countries. Australia’s Constitution lacks a bill of rights, 
thereby tempering (though not eliminating) the High Court’s ability to frustrate 
legislative majorities to protect individual rights. Canada does of course have the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and its Supreme Court aggressively polices it, 
but the Court might have done so too recently to generate an effectively mobilized 
backlash.
Fourth, and in aid of the third, the American public participates in the 
selection of Supreme Court Justices to a degree unheard of in most of the world. 
Confirmation hearings are the principal site at which the sociopolitical movement 
behind originalism invites the public into a conversation about constitutional 
methodology. No remotely comparable mechanism exists in Canada or in 
Australia, wherein the reigning government selects high court judges and wherein 
convention dictates that the selection be informed by some combination of 
expertise and ordinary political patronage rather than by ideological 
considerations.
Fifth, the American ethos of cultural and political assimilation inflates a 
narrative of fidelity to a unitary interpretation of the Constitution and deflates 
narratives of interpretive contest. The notion that interpretation should be open-
ended, not because the Constitution is but because the Constitution is 
, gains far more traction in Canadian legal discourse than in that of 
Australia or the United States. I suggest that this results in part from Canada’s 
existential commitment to multiculturalism.
Finally, something must be said of religion. Constitutionalism is often 
called our civil religion, and the originalism movement that so glorifies the 
Constitution’s original understanding is conspicuously commingled with an 
evangelical movement that tends to disfavor departures from the original meaning 
of God’s word. The United States in 2009 is the world’s most religious Western 
democracy, and a substantial number of Americans are at best ambivalent toward 
the use of reason and creativity in exegesis of sacred texts; yet that is precisely the 
toolkit of the judge tasked with applying constitutional principles dynamically 
rather than ministerially.
These six proposed hypotheses vary in strength and persuasiveness. 
Readers will have their favorites as I have mine. The list is not, moreover, meant 
to be exhaustive. (In fine non-originalist fashion, it answers not to the canon of 
.) It is sufficiently exemplary, however, to 
demonstrate that originalism is not culturally indifferent. The appeal of 
originalism domestically lies neither in its integrity as a theory of interpretation13
nor, wholly, in its success as a political practice.14 Rather, originalism is a product 
                                                  




exclusio unius est exclusio alterius
see supra
See id
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of time, of place, and of . Part V offers, then, that in the language of Philip 
Bobbitt’s well-known typology,15 historical argument is itself a form of ethical 
argument. Taken seriously, that realization is potentially self-defeating for 
originalists; and for non-originalists, it recommends foregoing the debater’s points 
so common in legal academic literature in favor of an aggressive emphasis on a 
contrary, more sympathetic ethos.
It is frequently said that all constitutional interpretation is originalist.16
That is not so much a statement about constitutional theory as about constitutional 
fidelity. Interpretation of a text entails deciphering one of two meanings: that 
intended by the text’s author or that understood by the text’s original audience.17
To assign some other meaning to a text—its contemporary meaning, for 
example—is to disclaim fidelity to it. If, by fortuity, the word “Senator” comes in 
a later age to mean “sandwich,” each state is not thereby entitled to two free 
lunches. Unless, that is, we are not interested in constitutional fidelity.18
When it comes to the customary nomenclature of American constitutional 
theory, we are not all originalists. To call oneself an originalist is not simply to 
proclaim fidelity to the Constitution but to privilege the original understanding of 
the document as against alterations to that understanding brought about through 
social change and judicial innovation. It is, moreover, to consider the original 
understanding dispositive or at least presumptively correct in matters of first 
impression. Most constitutional lawyers consider original understanding relevant 
but not dispositive: Precedent, unwritten implications from constitutional 
structure, contemporary public understanding, and political consequences are also 
relevant. Originalists generally are either, by degrees, less sanguine about these 
alternative sources of constitutional meaning, or believe them irrelevant to 
                                                  
15 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITU TION AL FATE (1982).
16 MICH AEL J. PERR Y, MOR ALITY POLITICS , AND LAW 280 (1988); Paul Horwitz, 
, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 459, 472 (1997) (reviewing LAUR A KALM AN, TH E STR ANGE CAREER OF LEG AL LIBER ALISM
(1996)); Lawrence B. Solum, , 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1603 
(1989).
17 PERRY, note 16; AN TONIN SC ALIA, , A MATTER  OF IN TERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COUR TS AND  THE LAW 129, 144 (1997).
18 That is not to say that fidelity requires that a principle embodied within a text be applied 
consistently across generations. Ronald Dworkin, , A MATTER OF 
IN TERPRETATION: FEDER AL COUR TS AND  THE LAW 115, 119-20 (1997); Jack M. Balkin, 
, 24 CONST. COMM . 291 (2007); Lawrence B. Solum, 




See The Past, 
Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory
Originalism as Transformative Politics
See supra Response in
See Comment in
Abortion 
and Original Meaning Semantic Originalism
available at
II. Our Originalism
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constitutional meaning but, for prudential reasons, appropriate in limited ways to 
the crafting of judicial decision rules.19
My use of the term “original understanding” is deliberate. As I use it, it 
can refer either to the original subjective intent of the framers or ratifiers as to the 
meaning and scope of a constitutional provision or to the original semantic 
meaning of the text of the provision. There has been a gradual but dramatic shift 
in preference among academic originalists in favor of original meaning rather 
than original intent.20 Here is not the place to examine the interesting arguments 
in favor of one or the other, except to note that one’s intent as to the scope of a 
provision and one’s reasonable expectation as to its application are both 
theoretically distinct from the original meaning of the provision’s text but in 
practice may be difficult to disentangle. Justice Scalia, for example, is notionally 
committed to the authority of original meaning but nonetheless cannot accept that 
the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” may in later years come to apply to 
capital punishment. Persuasive evidence as to original expected application, such 
as the references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment, seems in practice 
to drive Scalia’s assessment of original meaning.21 It is indeed difficult to recall a 
case in which any self-proclaimed originalist judge has perceived daylight 
between original meaning, original expected application, and original intent, 
notwithstanding the fierce academic debate over these distinctions.
The academic discourse around originalism also increasingly distinguishes 
between constitutional interpretation, which is a hermeneutic exercise common to 
literature and law alike, and constitutional construction, which is a political and 
adjudicative exercise designed to fill the interstices of constitutional text.22
Interpretive originalists and constructive originalists are conceptually separate 
populations, but this, again, is a distinction fastidiously maintained in academic 
literature but generally unexpressed in judicial opinions or public discourse.
It is perhaps obvious but is too little recognized that discussion of 
originalism is not confined to the academy.23 Originalism is a term that, today 
anyway, has content within a public discourse that extends well beyond the law 
reviews. Rush Limbaugh puts the matter succinctly:
                                                  
19 ROBER T H. BO RK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERIC A: THE POLITIC AL SEDUC TION OF THE LAW 158 
(1990); Antonin Scalia, , 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989); 
Mitchell N. Berman, , 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.1, 35 (2009).
20 Randy E. Barnett, , 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Keith 
E. Whittington, , 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608 (2004).
21 SC ALIA, note 11, at 46; Balkin, note 8, at 443-49.
22 KEITH  E. WH ITTING TON, CONSTITU TION AL IN TERPRETATION: TEX TU AL MEAN ING,
ORIGIN AL IN TEN T, & JUD ICIAL REVIEW 7-11 (1999).
23 Greene, note 1; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
See 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil
Originalism is Bunk




See supra Originalism as a Political Practice: The 
Right’s Living Constitution
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The only antidote to . . . judicial activism is the conservative 
judicial philosophy known as Originalism. As Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas explained in a February 2001 speech . . .: “The 
Constitution means what the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention and 
the state ratifying conventions understood it to mean; not what we judges 
think it should mean.” Hallelujah.
Originalism means not molding the Constitution to fit your 
political and social beliefs. It means not citing foreign law to support your 
preferences. It means not imposing your personal policy whims on society 
via judicial fiat. And where the Constitution is silent, it means not 
inventing a penumbra to support your own opinion.24
A significant segment of the population associates originalism with the values 
Limbaugh specifies.25 It is simple, it is suspicious of grants of discretion to legal 
elites, it is hostile to transnational sources of law, and, significantly, it is the “only 
antidote” to judicial activism.
Polling data suggests that a substantial number of Americans find 
originalism at least superficially compelling. A series of polls conducted annually 
by Quinnipiac University from 2003 to 2008 consistently found that four in ten 
Americans or more said that “[i]n making decisions, the Supreme Court should 
only consider the original intentions of the authors of the Constitution” as 
opposed to “consider[ing] changing times and current realities in applying the 
principles of the Constitution.”26 These polls perhaps suggest that much of the 
American public finds the distinction between original intent and original 
meaning far less interesting than do legal academics. Indeed, even though the 
debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in is best construed as a 
contest between the legal authority of constitutional meaning versus constitutional 
purpose,27 much of the public response to the decision assimilated both opinions 
to a single interpretive modality: original intent.28 In the great debates of 
                                                  
24 Rush Limbaugh, , THE LIMB AUGH LETTER 
(2005), available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.guest.html.
25 In 2005 Reagan Justice Department alum and radio talk-show host Mark Levin published a 
book called , in which originalism 
featured prominently. The book spent nine weeks on the best seller list. 
, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at 26.
26 Press Release, Quinnipiac Polling Institute, American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage 
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, but They Don’t Want Government To Ban It (July 17, 
2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/poling/us07172008.doc.
27 Greene, note 1, at 163.
28 columnist Charles Krauthammer’s response was typical of many:
I think what is really interesting is that the dissent by John Paul Stevens, the 
most distinguished of the liberals on the other side, . . . was almost entirely based on 
originalism, i.e. it was about what was intended by the founders at the time of the writing 
Heller
Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism? in
Men in Black: How the Supreme Court is Destroying America
New York Times See Best 
Sellers: April 24, 2005
See supra
Washington Post
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American constitutional theory, this error is a technical one only. As Scalia has 
written, “The Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not 
between Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original 
meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.”29
demonstrates the elevated space originalism occupies within 
American legal and political culture. The opinion overruled the opinions of 
dozens if not hundreds of federal court judges, read a 69-year-old Supreme Court 
precedent into oblivion, and called into serious question the gun control 
regulations of several of the nation’s largest and most crime-ridden metropolitan 
areas, including of course the one in which the Court itself sits. The Court did so 
over the stated objections of four Justices, five states, and the cities of Baltimore, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, 
Sacramento, San Francisco, Seattle, and Trenton.30 Against that opposition the 
Court relied almost entirely on a single proposition: that the original meaning of 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed” is not 
limited to the militia-related purpose that concededly animated the right’s 
codification.31
Virtually every constitutional court engages in pluralistic interpretation,32
but in very few would an opinion like be possible. First, it is not every 
court that feels sufficiently legitimated to order local governments to refrain from 
disarming their citizens. Second, those courts that do enjoy that level of 
legitimacy are infrequently originalist. Third, whether generally originalist or not, 
in no other country I am aware of is it conceivable that the court would mount 
such a direct political challenge solely on the basis of historical arguments that 
conflict with longstanding precedents and political practice. It was fewer than two 
decades ago, after all, that former Chief Justice Warren Burger (no pinko, he) 
                                                                                                                                          
of this amendment. . . . So I thought it was interesting agreement on that, on the 
philosophical premise.
Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox television broadcast Jun. 26, 2008). For additional 
examples in this vein, see Greene, note 1, at 687 and nn.181-82. 
29 SC ALIA, note 11, at 38.
30 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); . at 
2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for New York, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290); Brief of Major American Cities, 
et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 
(2008) (No. 07-290); Brief of the City of Chicago and the Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 
(2008) (No. 07-290).
31 , 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
32 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, , IN TERPRETING  CONSTITU TIONS: A COMPAR ATIVE 
STUD Y 321, 325 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006); . Vicki C. Jackson
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called the very argument used successfully in “one of the greatest pieces of 
fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special interest groups 
that I have ever seen in my lifetime.”33 Two years earlier Robert Bork—Robert 
Bork!—had said that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the right of states to 
form militia, not for individuals to bear arms,” and that all state gun-control laws 
were “probably constitutional.”34 Yet in the immediate aftermath of both 
John McCain, strongly, and Barack Obama, tepidly, endorsed the Court’s 
decision.35
Originalism is the instrument and the beneficiary of a deliberate decision 
by former Attorney General Edwin Meese and others to structure the Reagan 
Justice Department’s critique of the Warren and Burger Courts in jurisprudential 
terms. Abetted by organizations like the Federalist Society and think tanks like 
the Center for Judicial Studies, Meese began a campaign during Reagan’s second 
term to promote publicly the view that originalism is the only way to control 
activist judges.36 The rhetorical core of the campaign was a well-publicized series 
of speeches by Meese in 1985 and 1986. In a July 1985 speech to the American 
Bar Association, for example, Meese stated, “It has been and will continue to be 
the policy of this administration to press for a 
.”37 The Administration, he said, would “resurrect the original meaning” 
of constitutional provisions as “the only reliable guide for judgment.”38 When 
Bork was nominated to the Court in the summer of 1987, the American people 
had already been primed to debate the interpretive methodology Bork notoriously 
promoted.
Some form of originalism is not new to American judicial culture. It is not 
unusual to find strong statements of the need to give constitutional text the 
meaning intended by its framers in nineteenth-century Supreme Court opinions, 
ranging from Chief Justice Marshall’s dissent in ,39 to Chief 
                                                  
33 (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991).
34 Claudia Luther, , L.A. TIMES , Mar. 15, 1989, at 
B5, Reva B. Siegel, Heller, 
122 HAR V. L. REV. 191, 224 (2008).
35 Mike Dorning, 
, CHI. TR IB., Jun. 27, 2008, at 20.
36 Greene, note 1, at 680-81; Siegel, note 34, at 220-22.
37 Edwin Meese, III, , 
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986) (emphasis in original).
38 . at 465-66.
39 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“To say that the intention of the 
[Constitution] must prevail; that this intention must be collected from its words; that its words are 
to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the instrument 
was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to 
objects not contemplated in them, nor contemplated by its framers; —is to repeat what has been 
already said more at large, and is all that can be necessary.”).
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Justice Taney’s majority opinion in ,40 to Chief Justice 
Fuller’s opinion in .41 , a habeas 
case concerning the ability of a federal prosecutor to amend an indictment, is 
typical of nineteenth-century rhetoric. Justice Miller wrote: “It is never to be 
forgotten that, in the construction of the language of the Constitution here relied 
on, as indeed in all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are 
to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed 
that instrument.”42
The Progressive era saw the first serious scholarly and judicial challenges 
to the assumption that constitutional interpretation should be tied to original 
understanding. Justice Holmes’s pragmatism and Justice Brandeis’s prudentialism 
led both to be suspicious of doctrinaire interpretive modalities that limited the 
Constitution’s capacity to adapt to modern problems. Thus, in 
, Justice Holmes urged that the Constitution must grow along with the 
nation it is meant to govern: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have 
called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for 
them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a 
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that 
they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of 
our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred 
years ago.43
Justice Brandeis brandished his nonoriginalist credentials most pointedly in his 
dissent in , in which he argued that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the wiretapping of telephone conversations. He wrote, 
“[G]eneral limitations on the powers of Government . . . do not forbid the United 
States or the States from meeting modern conditions by regulations which a 
                                                  
40 60 U.S. 393, 426 (1857) (“If any of [the Constitution’s] provisions are deemed unjust, there is a 
mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains 
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only 
the same in words, but the same in meaning . . . and intent with which it spoke when it came from 
the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States.”).
41 157 U.S. 429, 558 (1895) (framing the Court’s inquiry into the constitutionality of the income 
tax as “what, at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted, were recognized as direct 
taxes? What did those who framed and adopted it understand the terms to designate and 
include?”).
42 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
43 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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century ago, or probably even a half a century ago, probably would have been 
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive,” and likewise “[c]lauses guaranteeing to the 
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar 
capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”44 The Court’s progressives “won” 
with Justice Roberts’s embrace of progressive interpretation over Justice 
Sutherland’s originalist dissent in , and in the 45 years 
between Sutherland’s retirement in 1941 and Justice Scalia’s appointment in 
1986, Hugo Black was the Court’s only self-avowed originalist.45
Meese and his allies’ frequent resort to metaphors of restoration—his use 
of the word “resurrect” was no accident—was facilitated by the Warren and 
Burger Courts’ refusal to ground a series of prominent individual rights decisions 
in originalist terms. ,46 ,47
,48 ,49 and 50 are among the usual suspects, 
and we could add 51 to the list were that case not 
preternaturally immune from judicial critique. Bork and Scalia alike have 
suggested that the Warren Court’s abandonment of originalism is an historical 
anomaly, and that it is the duty of the Court’s conservatives to right the ship.52
But in important ways, Our Originalism—the methodological child of the Meese 
movement—is not our fathers’. As Meese, Limbaugh, and Scalia frequently 
explain, they understand originalism to be a tool of judicial restraint; its 
alternative is an unattractive world in which “nine lawyers presume to be the 
authoritative conscience of the nation.”53 Justice Sutherland’s originalism 
emphatically did not emphasize judicial restraint, which Sutherland said “belongs 
in the domain of will and not of judgment.”54
It is ironic, then, that another distinguishing characteristic of the latest 
originalism movement is its hostility to precedent. Justice Thomas has suggested a 
willingness to overrule constitutional precedents that are contrary to the original 
understanding,55 and Justice Scalia, who has called himself a “faint-hearted 
originalist,”56 has indicated that his occasional deference to longstanding 
                                                  
44 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45 HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK , A CONSTITU TION AL FAITH (1968).
46 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
50 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52 BORK, note 19, at 143; Scalia, note 19, at 852-54.
53 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 , 300 U.S. at 403 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
55 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
56 Scalia, note 19, at 864.
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precedent that he disagrees with is “not [his] originalist philosophy, [but] a 
pragmatic to it.”57 was blithely dismissive of the Court’s Second 
Amendment decision in ,58 and Justice Scalia has 
advocated abandoning prior precedent in favor of original understanding in Eighth 
Amendment, campaign finance, and abortion cases among others.59 By contrast, 
there was no significant tension articulated between originalism and 
before Justice Black’s tenure on the Court.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the originalism of today is the 
product of a political mobilization. It is not merely the idiosyncratic preference of 
a single Justice, as in the case of Black; it is a movement that preceded the 
nominations of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas and was deliberately designed 
to produce their jurisprudential approaches. It is discussed on talk radio and in 
bestselling books; in blogs and in newspaper columns; in presidential campaigns 
and at water coolers. Originalism has not “triumphed,” as some suggested in the 
wake of .60 But it has proven persuasive in a non-trivial number of cases,61
it lies squarely at the center of academic conversation in constitutional theory, and 
it is an important part of the national dialogue, such as there is one, about the 
proper role of the judiciary within a democracy. Or our democracy, at least.
                                                  
57 SC ALIA, note 17, at 140; Michael J. Gerhardt, 
, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 32 (1994).
58 307 U.S. 174 (1939); , 128 S. Ct. at 2814-15.
59 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting the holding of 
, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality 
guarantee); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 247 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing, , 494 U.S. 652 (1990), that limitations 
on corporate campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment and noting his view that, 
, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), campaign contribution limits also violate the First 
Amendment); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that , (1973), 
should be overruled); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling 
, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), to hold that the admission of testimonial hearsay without an 
opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant violates the Sixth Amendment).
60 , J. Harvie Wilkinson III, , 95 
VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009); Randy E. Barnett, 
, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13; on a First Read, Posting of Dale Carpenter to the 
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008 5:03 p.m. EST); 
. Randy E. Barnett, , 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999) 
(declaring originalism’s ascendancy by the end of the 1990s).
61 , 128 S. Ct. 2783; , 541 U.S. 236; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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Outside the United States, American originalism is as well-known as it is 
marginalized. The reasons for the latter, which I take up in Part IV, are 
complicated. The former is more easily explained in light of the cross-
pollinization of constitutional theory through scholarly exchange, transnational 
judicial conferences, and cross-reference in judicial practice—what Sujit 
Choudhury has called the “migration” of constitutional ideas.62 Since the start of 
2007 more than 100 academic articles with originalism have been 
published in legal periodicals, and a vast array of resources greet the foreign judge 
or constitutional theorist interested in comparative study. The law journal 
database maintained by Washington & Lee School of Law includes more than 200 
international and comparative law journals, more than 100 of which are located 
outside the United States,63 and Lexis-Nexis serves customers in more than 100 
countries.64 Judges around the world also of course interact in person in a wide 
range of settings,65 and Justice Scalia is no exception. Justice Scalia took at least 
25 trips to foreign locations for speeches, teaching, and conferences from 2003 to 
2007.66 Originalism is a frequent topic of conversation at those appearances.67
The trouble is, hardly anyone is biting. If we take originalism to require 
that the original understanding of a constitutional text is dispositive when known,
it is an exceedingly unpopular view around the world. Michel Rosenfeld calls 
originalism “virtually nonexistent” in all of Europe.68 The highly influential 
German Constitutional Court has favored a purposive approach to interpretation 
that generally privileges over original intentions.69 The high courts of India, 
                                                  
62 SUJIT CHOUDHUR Y, , THE 
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63 Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx.
64 LexisNexis Fast Facts, http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/fast-facts.aspx.
65 Anne-Marie Slaughter, , 40 VA. J. IN T’L L. 1103 (2000).
66 Locations include Switzerland, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Australia, Turkey, Canada, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Greece, and France.
67 , Kirby, 
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South Africa, and Israel display something approaching open hostility to narrow 
textualism or static historicism.70 In Canada, as we shall see, even the most vocal 
opponents of the Supreme Court’s putatively activist decisions infrequently resort 
to originalist arguments. Australia’s appears to be among the world’s very few 
established constitutional courts in which arguments from the original 
understandings of the ratifying generation are taken seriously in the face of 
contrary teleological arguments grounded in contemporary understandings.
These last two examples are the subject of this Part. In examining in some 
detail the approaches the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of 
Australia take to interpretation of their national constitutions, I hope to generate 
hypotheses as to the causes of originalism’s particular uses and relative popularity 
in the United States. Part III.A discusses Canada, in which the “living tree” 
analogy continues to exert a powerful influence on constitutional discourse in 
rights and powers cases alike. Part III.B addresses the more complicated case of 
Australia, whose High Court has traditionally espoused a textual literalism that is 
relatively strict and historically informed but has recently been receptive to 
purposivism and to the dynamic influence of contemporary values.
Modern Canadian constitutionalism began, with modern Canada, in 1982. 
Although Canada became a distinct and de facto self-governing legal entity with 
the enactment of the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act), it did not 
become formally sovereign until the Canada Act, 1982. The Canada Act declared 
more than 30 documents to constitute Canadian Supreme Law, the most 
significant of which were the BNA Act (renamed the Constitution Act, 1867), the 
Constitution Act, 1982 (Schedule B of the Canada Act), and the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (the first 35 sections of the Constitution Act, 1982). This Section 
broadly discusses judicial review by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
and the Supreme Court of Canada, first under the BNA Act—which principally 
involved federalism disputes—and more recently under the Constitution Act, 
1982, where Charter litigation predominates.
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The BNA Act merged the three British colonies of Canada, New 
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into the nation of Canada. The former colony of 
Canada, previously subdivided into East and West, was separated into the 
provinces of Québec and Ontario, giving the original nation of Canada a total of 
four provincial governments. Canada was given a federal structure with a 
bicameral parliament and a vertical separation of powers between the national and 
the provincial governments. Since the BNA Act did not include a Bill of Rights, 
the Canadian parliament was, like the British parliament, supreme within its 
legitimate sphere of action.71 The content of that sphere was contested from the 
start, however, as the boundaries between national and provincial power were 
blurred in the BNA Act.72 Specifically, section 91 of the Act gives the federal 
government exclusive jurisdiction over several broad areas thought to be of 
national interest, including “trade and commerce,” and section 92 gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to provincial governments over other broad areas thought to be locally 
focused, such as “property and civil rights.”73 It is easy to imagine examples in 
which these grants of authority cannot be mutually exclusive.74
The power of the Canadian national government was initially bounded, 
moreover, by the superior authority of the Crown. British statutes applied in full 
force in Canada until the Statute of Westminster, 1931 provided that Canada’s 
legislature could opt in or out.75 Canada did not formally acquire the power to 
amend its own Supreme Law until 1982. The British place atop Canada’s legal 
hierarchy was particularly relevant to the practice of judicial review during 
Canada’s early history. The Supreme Court of Canada is a statutory animal, 
created by an act of the Canadian parliament in 1875 and currently authorized not 
by the Constitution but by the Supreme Court Act.76 Until 1949 the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, sitting on Downing Street, was Canada’s 
appellate court of last resort, and over a fifty-year period from 1880 to 1930 the 
Privy Council took a rather heavy-handed approach to its Canadian constitutional 
duties.77
The Privy Council set the interpretive tone early, with Lord Hobhouse 
declaring in the 1887 case of that the BNA Act should 
                                                  
71 Hodge v. The Queen, 9 App. Cas. 117, 132 (P.C. 1883) (appeal taken from Ont.).
72 Peter W. Hogg, , IN TERPRETING
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73 Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 91(2), 92(13).
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be treated “by the same methods of construction and exposition that [British 
courts] apply to other statutes.”78 What that meant in theory was that 
constitutional interpretation was to be guided by literal textual exegesis that relied 
rigidly on original public meaning coupled with and that strictly 
ignored extrinsic sources or reference to the intent of the legislature.79 What it 
meant in practice and in effect was a gradual diminution in national power in 
relation to provincial governments.80 From 1880 to 1896 the Privy Council 
decided twenty issues concerning the separation of powers between the federal 
and provincial governments, and it ruled in favor of the provinces in fifteen of 
them.81 The strict federalism the Law Lords enforced was arguably consistent 
with the text of the BNA Act but was very much at odds with the constitutional 
vision of many of the Act’s drafters.82
The Privy Council dramatically and self-consciously departed from static 
text-bound interpretation in the 1930 case of ,
popularly known as the “Persons Case.”83 The BNA Act provides that the 
Canadian Senate is to comprise “qualified persons,” a term whose original 
meaning, in the unanimous view of the Supreme Court of Canada, did not include 
women.84 The case might easily have stood as Canada’s ,85
but Lord Sankey turned it into Canada’s : “the 
                                                  
78 Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575, 579 (P.C. 1887) (appeal taken from Can.).
79 Hogg, note 72, at 79; Vincent C. MacDonald, 
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appeal to history,” he wrote, “is not conclusive.”86 Rather, Lord Sankey said that 
constitutional interpretation requires attention to the “continuous process of 
evolution” within Canadian society.87 In what has become the most famous 
passage in Canadian constitutional law, he wrote further:
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree 
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of 
the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. Like all written 
constitutions it has been subjected to development through usage and 
convention. Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this 
Board—it is certainly not their desire—to cut down the provisions of the 
Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large 
and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within 
certain fixed limits, may be a mistress in her own house, as the provinces 
to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs.88
In one stroke Lord Sankey’s opinion in effected four reversals, each 
momentous standing alone.89 First, and most immediately, it overturned the 
Supreme Court and granted women the right to serve in the Senate. Second, in 
drawing a parallel between the sovereignty retained within the provinces and that 
retained within the national legislature, the Committee seemed to signal an end to 
its prior bias in favor of provincial authority. Third, the Privy Council recognized 
Canada’s autonomy to govern her own internal affairs, a nod to the Statute of 
Westminster that was already en route to passage and a presage to the formal end 
to Privy Council jurisdiction over Canadian cases, which would come nineteen 
years later.90 Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, the BNA Act would 
henceforward no longer be interpreted as an ordinary statute whose meaning is 
inalterably fixed by the original meaning of its text and judicial interpretation 
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thereof.91 Instead, interpretation would be “large and liberal,” with an eye trained 
not on narrow constructions of statutory text but on constitutional purposes and 
national growth.
The idea of a constitution as a living entity was not, of course, invented by 
Lord Sankey. Abbott Lawrence Lowell described a political system as “not a 
mere machine [but] an organism” as early as 1889, and the notion of fundamental 
law as essentially organic influenced the likes of Woodrow Wilson and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes.92 But the metaphor of constitutional evolution ripened earlier in 
Canada than in the United States. Although was in effect a rights case, 
the Judicial Committee quickly extended the living tree principle to structural 
cases. Thus, in , the 
Committee affirmed the authority of the national government to enact a statute 
criminalizing certain anti-competitive behavior even though the offenses were not 
criminal at the time of Confederation.93 And in 
, the Committee upheld a federal statute removing the Privy Council’s 
criminal appellate jurisdiction and reiterated that “in interpreting a constituent or 
organic statute such as the [BNA] Act, that construction most beneficial to the 
widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted.”94 As in the United 
States during the same period, a rejection of originalism was usually in the service 
of judicial restraint; the idea was that the Constitution should not be construed so 
literally as to hamstring a government in responding to the vital issues of the 
day.95
And as in the United States, judicial conservatives went down fighting. In 
1935 Lord Sankey, author of and , was replaced as Lord 
Chancellor, and Lord Atkin became the Judicial Committee’s presiding Law Lord 
and intellectual leader. Atkin, a former commercial lawyer, was sympathetic with 
the notion of freedom of contract and was known to be a staunch defender of 
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.96 The timing of Lord Sankey’s departure could hardly have been 
worse, then, for Prime Minister R.B. Bennett’s New Deal package of labor 
reforms and social insurance measures. In 
( ), the Committee invalidated Bennett’s wage and 
hours measures on the ground that, though the statutes were enacted pursuant to 
an international treaty under section 132 of the BNA Act, the measures 
improperly infringed on provincial autonomy over property and civil rights 
granted by section 92.97 Lord Atkin’s opinion in the case 
offered a lyrical rejoinder to the notion that the decision would frustrate Canada’s
blossoming into a sovereign member of the international community: “While the 
ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains 
the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original 
structure.”98
Unemployment insurance was next, with Lord Atkin dismissing the 
Dominion’s argument that, even if insurance was traditionally within the 
provincial bailiwick, the legislation creating an unemployment insurance fund fell 
within its residual power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government 
of Canada in a time of emergency.99 The Judicial Committee also struck down 
Dominion statutes regulating natural products and unfair competition,100 again on 
federalism grounds. With the New Deal decisions, “the approach to judicial 
review, heralded in . . . was not only abandoned but explicitly 
repudiated.”101
Lord Atkin announced all of the New Deal decisions on the same January 
day in 1937. It is more than a little bit ironic that the decisions came down as the 
U.S. Supreme Court was deep in deliberation over .102
For while Justice Roberts was engineering the switch in time that saved nine, 
Lord Atkin was unwittingly laying the groundwork for abolition of appeals to the 
Privy Council. The local reaction to the Committee’s New Deal decisions was 
                                                  
96 SAYWELL , note 81, at 218-19.
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99 AG Canada v. AG Ontario (The Employment and Social Insurance Act), [1937] A.C. 355, 
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377 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.); AG Ontario v. AG Canada, [1937] A.C. 405 (P.C.) (appeal 
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swift and largely negative, in particular from a group of Progressive scholars led 
by University of Toronto Law School Dean William Paul McClure Kennedy and 
McGill law professor Francis Reginald Scott.103 Kennedy had written 
optimistically during Lord Sankey’s tenure that “the older constitutional law is 
being handed over to the historians.”104 Understandably, his optimism did not 
survive the New Deal decisions. In a symposium in the 
devoted to those decisions, he wrote:
The time has come to abandon tinkering with or twisting the 
British North America Act—a curiosity belonging to an older age. At long 
last we can criticize it, as the stern demands of economic pressure have 
bitten into the bastard loyalty which gave to it the doubtful devotion of 
primitive ancestor worship.105
Referring to the necessary reliance of Canadian law on English conventions of 
statutory interpretation, Kennedy virtually seethed, “We would have faced this 
issue long ago had we not too largely believed that constitutional and legal 
wisdom never really crossed the Atlantic.”106 Writing in the same symposium, 
Scott sounded a similar note: “No alterations to the British North America Act 
will ever achieve what Canadians want them to achieve if their interpretation is 
left to a non-Canadian judiciary.”107
Not just the academy bristled. The Senate instructed its counsel, W.F. 
O’Connor, to prepare a report on the origins of the BNA Act and its interpretation 
by the Privy Council. The O’Connor Report, as it came to be known, argued that 
the Privy Council had profoundly misinterpreted the intended division of power 
between the national and provincial governments, and that (unlike in the United 
States) authority was presumptively to rest with the former.108 O’Connor’s 
conclusions remained orthodoxy for three decades,109 during which time Ottawa 
made its move. In 1939 Tory MP Charles Cahan introduced a bill abolishing all 
appeals to the Privy Council and Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe referred the 
bill to the Supreme Court for a ruling on its constitutionality. The Court found the 
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bill constitutional and the Judicial Committee affirmed on the authority of the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931.110 Appeals to the Privy Council were officially 
abolished with passage of the bill and British approval in 1949.
Once the Supreme Court of Canada officially became Canada’s court of 
last resort in 1949, it not only became far more hospitable to claims of federal 
authority111 but it also accelerated the judiciary’s break from the canons of British 
statutory interpretation. Thus, although the Court still adheres to in 
the ordinary course, it has on occasion refused to follow precedents of the Privy 
Council.112 Likewise, the strict ban on reference to parliamentary debate, not 
relaxed in the House of Lords until ,113 was lifted in Canadian 
constitutional cases in the 1970s,114 and the Supreme Court is not mechanically 
opposed to referring to the legislative history of the BNA Act.115 Indeed, 
mitigation of the old English exclusionary rule with respect to extrinsic sources 
has been justified by way of the living tree metaphor. In the 
reference, the Court permitted admission of various policy reports of the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission. Wrote Justice Dickson, “A constitutional 
reference is not a barren exercise in statutory interpretation. What is involved is 
an attempt to determine and give effect to the broad objectives and purpose of the 
Constitution, viewed as a ‘living tree’, in the expressive words of Lord 
Sankey.”116
The Court has used the metaphor regularly since the late 1970s, coinciding 
roughly with the strength of the patriation movement. Thus, the Court held in 
1979 that a Québec law declaring that official publication of statutes was to be in 
French alone was inconsistent with section 133 of the BNA Act, which requires 
that provincial legislative acts be published in both English and French.117 In 
addressing whether “regulations” published in French also fell within the purview 
of section 133, which refers only to “acts,” the Court cited and wrote: 
“Dealing, as this Court is here, with a constitutional guarantee, it would be overly-
technical to ignore the modern development of non-curial adjudicative agencies 
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which play so important a role in our society.”118 The living tree doctrine served 
provincial rather than federal ends in another pre-Charter federalism case, 
( ), in which the Court 
refused to limit the scope of provincial taxing authority to property even though 
“direct taxation within the province,” authorized by section 92 of the BNA Act, 
may not have been understood in 1867 to permit in personam taxes.119
The living tree metaphor has had a nebulizing effect in structural cases, 
freeing both provincial and federal power to spread into domains not originally 
anticipated. As we shall see, however, the metaphor has been most fertile in rights 
cases, in which its effect is quite the opposite.120
The advent of the Constitution Act, 1982 meant that for the first time in its 
history the Supreme Court of Canada would be constitutionally committed to 
holding parliamentary and provincial acts invalid on the ground that they violated 
individual rights.121 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes an extensive list 
of enumerated rights, including the “fundamental freedoms” of conscience and 
religion; thought, belief, opinion and expression, including press and other media 
of communication; peaceful assembly; and association.122 The Charter also 
guarantees, , the rights to vote, to receive a host of criminal procedural 
protections, and to be free from unreasonable search or seizure, arbitrary 
detention, and cruel and unusual punishment.123 The Charter studiously avoids the 
phrase “due process of law,” on which more later, but it does guarantee equality 
“before and under the law”124 and “the right to life, liberty and security of the 
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person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.”125
Although the Constitution Act, 1982 contains a Supremacy Clause,126 it 
also subjects constitutional guarantees to two express limitations. First, the 
enumerated rights and freedoms are pronounced “subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.”127 The Charter, then, makes explicit what in the United States has been 
left to judicial construction: a decision rule for declaring actionable rights 
violations.128 Second, section 33 of the Charter permits either the national or a 
provincial legislature to declare that a legislative act remains in force 
notwithstanding a judicial determination that it violates certain individual rights 
guaranteed under the Charter.129 The declaration lasts five years and is subject to 
renewal by a second vote of the legislature. Québec, which is bound by but has 
not ratified the Constitution Act, 1982, retroactively inserted a notwithstanding 
declaration into all of its domestic laws in 1982, and its national assembly 
invoked the notwithstanding clause for every piece of legislation passed between 
1982 and 1985.130 Outside of Québec, however, use of the notwithstanding 
mechanism is rare—it has been invoked remedially only thrice by other provinces 
and never by the federal parliament.131
The sole remaining official recourse against an unpopular Charter decision 
is constitutional amendment, but this avenue is only moderately easier than the 
Article V process under the U.S. Constitution.132 Most Charter amendments 
require agreement of both the House of Commons and the Senate as well as seven 
of the ten provincial assemblies. Moreover, an informal norm has developed in 
Canada of submitting amendments to popular referendum. This process has 
included some spectacular and politically inopportune defeats, including most 
prominently the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, which was designed to secure 
Québec’s ratification of the Constitution. Even though the federal government, all 
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ten provincial assembles, the leaders of the three leading political parties, and the 
leaders of four national aboriginal groups supported the accord, it was defeated 54 
percent to 46 percent. Says Peter Hogg, “One must conclude that significant 
amendments to the Constitution of Canada are, at least for the foreseeable future, 
impossible.”133
All of which is to say that judicial interpretations of the Charter are 
immensely consequential political acts. In light of the Court’s history—two 
decades earlier Ronald Cheffins had labeled it “the quiet court in an unquiet 
country”134—it was not inevitable that it would shed its customary timidity upon 
enactment of the Charter, but the Justices took to their new role with 
uncharacteristic verve. So much so that by the Charter’s tenth anniversary former 
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer was prepared to call the Charter “a revolution [on 
the scale of] introducing the metric system . . . . Pasteur’s discoveries [and] the 
invention of penicillin [and] the laser.”135 In 22 years of adjudication under the 
1960 statutory Bill of Rights, only 5 of 35 plaintiffs won their Supreme Court 
cases and the Court invalidated only one federal statute.136 Over the first 24 years 
of judicial review under the Charter, the Court invalidated 89 laws, including 53 
federal statutes.137
The range of cases to which the Canadian judicial power has extended is 
broader than in the United States. Canada has no political question or ripeness 
doctrine, and mootness and standing rules are lax by comparison.138 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court regards its competence as comprising a broad remedial 
authority.139 Thus, in , the Court found unconstitutional the 
Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act for a sin of omission, that is, for not 
including sexual orientation as a protected ground from employment 
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discrimination.140 As a remedy, the Court read sexual orientation into the statute 
despite a deliberate legislative decision to exclude it. Wrote Justice Iacobucci in 
defense of the aggressive remedy, “by definition, Charter scrutiny will always 
involve some interference with the legislative will.”141
More startling from a U.S. constitutional orientation is the 
, in which the Court was asked to decide whether Québec 
could unilaterally secede from Canada.142 For a court even to answer such a 
question is, in a manner of speaking, foreign to our constitutional sensibilities.143
Québec’s as well, I should add—the province refused to participate in the case on 
political question grounds. The Supreme Court of Canada not only answered the 
question—in the negative—but it did so without reference to anything so concrete 
as text or history, the confluence of which forms the core of Our Originalism. 
Rather, the Court derived its decision from what it identified as four 
unenumerated but fundamental principles which “breathe life” into the Canadian 
Constitution: federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law; and 
respect for minorities.144 The Court wrote in its per curiam opinion: 
“[O]bservance of and respect for these principles is essential to the ongoing 
process of constitutional development and evolution of our Constitution as a 
‘living tree,’ . . .”145 The Court ultimately decided that while Québec could not 
secede unilaterally, if the people of Québec were clearly to express a desire to 
secede, all other parties to Confederation would be obligated to renegotiate the 
Constitution to give voice to that expression.146 A judicious decision, to be sure, 
but not one many Americans would recognize as properly judicial.
The post-Charter Supreme Court of Canada has, with limited exceptions, 
been at least as hospitable to rights claims as the U.S. Supreme Court. It has found 
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comparable constitutional protections in areas such as criminal procedure, 
religious freedom, freedom of association and assembly, and privacy rights.147 As 
the case suggests, the Supreme Court of Canada has far outpaced its 
American cousin in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.148 Canada’s high court is also more receptive to claims that sound in 
group rights. The Charter specifically protects both affirmative action policies and 
minority language rights, and any constitutional amendment dealing with 
language rights requires unanimous support from the provinces.149 Indeed, among 
the few individual rights that the Supreme Court of Canada protects less than the 
U.S. Supreme Court are those that are competitive with group claims. Thus, the 
Court not only has upheld a national hate speech law150 but has permitted the 
criminalization of pornography that degrades women, on the theory that it 
constitutes a form of hate speech.151
But the substantive differences between Canadian and American rights 
jurisprudence are minor by comparison to the methodological and rhetorical gulf 
separating the two Supreme Courts. The former gulf is, understandably, narrower 
than the latter. As Part II discusses, the U.S. Supreme Court is methodologically 
pluralistic, and the bark of the domestic originalism movement has always been 
worse than its bite. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has never suggested 
that original understanding, even at a relatively low level of abstraction, is wholly 
irrelevant.152 But it does not overstate things to suggest that a decision like 
is unimaginable in Canada. Among jurists, legal scholars, and (by all indications) 
the Canadian public, the notion that a court’s conclusions as to the expectations of 
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the founding generation should be sufficient to dispose of a present individual 
rights case is nearly risible.
A couple of examples should set the mood. Consider first the 
.153 At issue was the constitutionality of a 
British Columbia law that made driving with a suspended license a strict liability 
criminal offense with a mandatory jail term. The Supreme Court held, 
unanimously, that criminal liability and imprisonment without a element 
violated the Charter-enshrined right not to be deprived of liberty “except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”154 That language, found in 
section 7 of the Charter, is deliberately tortured. Prior to adoption of the Charter, 
the legislative committee tasked with reviewing the draft heard testimony from 
numerous Department of Justice officials who explained that in composing the 
text they specifically avoided using the term “due process” so as to avoid the 
paradoxically substantive connotations of that phrase in United States 
jurisprudence.155
That bit of history did not impress the Court. Writing for all of his eight 
colleagues, Justice Lamer wrote that such testimony was entitled to “minimal 
weight.”156 It was impossible, on his view, to locate a general legislative intent, 
and it would be inappropriate to make dispositive in Charter interpretation “the 
comments of a few federal civil servants.”157 Moreover, placing any significant 
weight on the committee proceedings would mean that:
[T]he rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in effect 
become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no 
possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing societal 
needs. . . . If the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter is to have 
the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to 
ensure that historical materials . . . do not stunt its growth.158
Instead, the Court said unequivocally that interpretation under the Charter was to 
be “purposive;” that is, with reference to the interests a given provision is meant 
to protect. Quoting Chief Justice Dickson’s earlier statement in 
, Justice Lamer wrote that any interpretation of Charter rights should be “a 
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the 
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guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s 
protection.”159
This approach marks a significant departure from U.S. jurisprudence along 
several dimensions. First, the Court’s dismissive attitude toward drafting records 
is not just anti-originalist but is more broadly anti-historicist. The intentions of the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution, specific and otherwise, remain a vital source of 
American constitutional wisdom.160 Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in 
sought to rein in Justice Scalia not through an appeal to the living Constitution but 
through relentless emphasis on the intent of the drafters of the Second 
Amendment.161 If the Great Divide in the United States is, as Justice Scalia says, 
between original meaning and current meaning, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
pledged its allegiance to the latter in the clearest of terms.162
Second, even granting a stateside trend away from original-intent 
originalism,163 the approach reflected in Justice Lamer’s opinion is starkly 
different from U.S. orthodoxy. Public-meaning originalism does not depend on 
drafting history to determine constitutional meaning, but as Justice Scalia has 
acknowledged, such history can provide clues as to the original understanding of 
the ratifying public.164 The Supreme Court of Canada could have profitably 
adopted this approach in the : Barry Strayer, 
one of the Charter’s principal drafters, testified that he understood “fundamental 
justice” to be interchangeable with “natural justice,”165 and indeed the Supreme 
Court itself had given the terms equivalence in , which 
construed “fundamental justice” under the Canadian Bill of Rights.166 Natural 
justice is a familiar common law and administrative law concept in Canada that 
generally refers to procedural, not substantive, fairness.167 Justice Lamer’s refusal 
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163 note 20 and accompanying text.
164 , 128 S. Ct. at 2805; . Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (stating that 
the drafting history of a treaty “may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous”).
165 note 155, .
166 Duke v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 917.
167 Martin Loughlin, , 
28 U. TORON TO L.J. 215, 217-18 (1978); H.L.A. Hart, , 
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to accord decent respect to the opinions of the Charter’s drafters even to clarify 
the original understanding reflects a singular discomfort with turns to history as 
an interpretive aide.168
Finally, and perhaps most unusually from a U.S. perspective, the 
committed the Court to a specific and 
aggressive method of constitutional interpretation. Self-proclaimed and 
unanimous confidence in the high court’s preferred interpretive methodology is 
unknown this side of the St. Lawrence. Not only is it rare for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to coalesce around a specific interpretive approach, but it is relatively 
uncommon for Court opinions to contain extended discussions of constitutional 
theory.169
Not so the Supreme Court of Canada, which with little controversy has 
invoked the living tree metaphor—an explicit excursion into constitutional 
theory—in no fewer than nineteen lead opinions since the Charter was enacted.170
Indeed, the Court used the metaphor in its very first case under the Charter, 
, in which it held that an Ontario law 
limiting bar membership to Canadian citizens did not offend the Charter.171 In a 
lengthy discourse on the fundamentals of interpretation of a constitutional 
instrument, complete with quotations from 172 and 
                                                                                                                                          
both sides of a dispute are often referred to as rules of natural justice.”); Jeremy Waldron, 
, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2008) (referring to Hart’s rules of 
natural justice as “the truly procedural principles”).
168 Hogg, note 72, at 79, 83. The Court has occasionally resorted to originalism in order 
to preserve a specific historic compromise, particularly in aboriginal cases. , R. v. Blais, 
[2003] S.C.R. 236 (holding based on historical context that the Métis are excluded from the 
definition of “Indian” in the Manitoba Natural Resources Transfer Agreement); R. v. Van der 
Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507, 548 (holding it consistent with a purposive approach to interpretation to 
declare that the aboriginal rights protected in § 35 of the Charter are not dynamic but refer to 
traditions identifiable prior to aboriginal contact with Europeans); Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.R. 
609 (refusing to extend state support for minority denominational schools in Ontario and Québec, 
as established under the BNA Act, to other sectarian schools).
169 Mark Tushnet, , 72 B.U. L. REV. 
747, 752 (1992); Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (“Our history does not impose 
any rigid formula to constrain the disposition of cases.”).
170 Morton & Knopff, note 95, at 533 (“While the living tree doctrine evolved in the 
judicial interpretation of the [BNA Act], especially the law of federalism, no one has questioned 
the appropriateness of transferring it to the Charter.”); Raymond Bazowski, 
, CONSTITU TION AL POLITICS IN 
CAN AD A AND  THE UN ITED STATES, note 131, at 223, 231 (“[A]lmost as soon as members of 
the Supreme Court began to interpret the Charter, they announced their ambition to engage in a 
purposive analysis of its clauses that would not be limited to an examination of legislative intent. 
That this gesture earned no stern rebuke from the very legislatures that had just produced the 
Charter testifies to a legislative acceptance of a noninterpretivist judicial strategy in Canada.”).
171 [1984] S.C.R. 357.
172 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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,173 the Court stated that “[n]arrow and technical interpretation, if not 
modulated by a sense of the unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the 
law and hence the community it serves.”174
More recently, the Court used the living tree analogy to uphold the 
constitutionality of a federal law fixing a gender-neutral definition of marriage.175
Notwithstanding the obvious rights implications of the decision, it arose as a 
federalism question: With characteristic opacity, the BNA Act places the subject 
of “Marriage and Divorce” under the head of exclusive federal jurisdiction, while 
“Solemnization of Marriage in the Province” is an exclusively provincial 
matter.176 The Supreme Court found that this gave the federal government domain 
over marriage capacity and the provinces domain over marriage performance. But 
was the meaning of marriage the same as the common law definition circa 1867? 
We now know enough about the Court to answer this question without even 
reading the opinion. That is, as the Court wrote, “[t]he ‘frozen concepts’ 
reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian 
constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way 
of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern 
life.”177
The Supreme Court’s hostility to constitutional historicism and its
repeated incantations of the living tree metaphor do not seem to have damaged its 
credibility with the public, nor are these significant concerns even of the Court’s 
academic critics. There is little evidence of widespread Canadian opposition to the 
Court’s exercise of power under the Charter’s auspices.178 A 2007 survey of 
Canadians found that 54 percent of respondents thought the Supreme Court was 
“moving our society in the right direction,” whereas 37 percent thought the Court 
was moving society in the wrong direction. Remarkably, even among those in the 
“wrong direction” cohort, opposition to the Court was not framed in terms of 
judicial activism or the countermajoritarian difficulty familiar to U.S. discourse. 
Asked the open-ended question of why they believed the Court was moving 
society in the wrong direction, 25 percent expressed general dissatisfaction with 
                                                  
173 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton’s) 316 (1819).
174 , [1984] S.C.R. at 366.
175 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.R. 698.
176 Constitutional Act, 1867, §§ 91(26); 92(12).
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the Court’s work, and 26 percent suggested that the Court was soft on crime.179
The sorts of criticisms that tend to recur in books like Mark Levin’s , 
on talk radio, and at congressional hearings—“[o]ut of touch with mainstream 
society” (4.6 percent); “[t]oo political” (3.5 percent); allowing abortion/same-sex 
marriage (1.9 percent)—barely registered.180
None of which is to say that the Court is without its critics. The “activism” 
of the Supreme Court of Canada is a frequent topic of discussion among 
academics and politicians.181 But vanishingly few of the Court’s critics insist that 
its members should be constrained by the historical meaning of the 
Constitution.182 Indeed, two of the most prominent among them, F.L. Morton and 
Rainer Knopff, argue that the Court’s incorporation of evolutionary principles 
into constitutional interpretation is an error only of degree. They write, “We are 
not opposed to all possible uses of the ‘living tree’ analogy, and our critique of its 
more extreme version does not imply the acceptance of similarly extreme (and 
simplistic) versions of the ‘original intent’ or ‘frozen concepts’ approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.”183 Rather, Morton and Knopff invoke the Canadian 
tradition of parliamentary supremacy to argue for greater deference to the 
democratic decisionmaking of the whole, as against the narrow interests of 
aboriginal groups and other minorities. They argue, echoing James Bradley 
Thayer, that granting courts the power to render inconclusive the results of 
democratic deliberation weakens the national commitment to robust 
democracy.184 Theirs is, in that sense, a critique in the minimalist tradition.
Likewise, when the Supreme Court received an unusual and much-
discussed rebuke in a unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeal of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Justice William Marshall made no reference to the 
text, history, or structure of the Charter. The case, 
, concerned whether the 
Charter’s equality provision granted female public healthcare workers a right to 
negotiated retroactive pay equity adjustments notwithstanding a legislative 
                                                  
179 The Court’s criminal procedure decisions have been its least popular, but complaints in this 
area have not typically been originalist in nature. , Celeste McGovern, 
, ALBER TA REPOR T, Sept. 21, 1998, at 20.
180 SES Research, 2007 Nationstate Omnibus Survey—Views on Supreme Court, 
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determination that honoring the adjustments would violate a recently enacted 
fiscal restraint law.185 Justice Marshall argued that the Supreme Court had not 
given sufficient attention to the doctrine of separation of powers in its 
proportionality decisions under section 1 of the Charter: “it cannot be said that s. 
1 endows the judiciary with license to stand in the shoes of the other branches of 
government as ultimate arbitrator of which policy choices were in the best 
interests of the governed.”186 The reason Justice Marshall believed that section 1 
has been misapplied was not because of how it was intended or understood in 
1982, but rather because he believed the Court was trampling on an 
constitutional convention.187
* * *
Legal academics frequently argue that the debate over judicial activism in 
the United States is hollow. The activist judge, after all, is the one who gets it 
wrong.188 There being no shortage of Canadians who think the Supreme Court of 
Canada gets cases wrong, and frequently so, the charge of judicial activism is a 
familiar one north of the border. As Sheldon Pollack writes, “There has been a 
comparable disagreement in Canada over divining and articulating rights under 
the authority of the Charter.”189 What has not been comparable is the rhetoric of 
the Courts’ critics. The substantial movement in the United States that views 
judicial activism in terms of inattention to the original meaning of the 
Constitution has no Canadian counterpart. Rather, both the Canadian judiciary 
and its many critics have for much of the Charter’s history been “virtually 
unanimous” in endorsing a “living tree” approach to articulating Charter rights.190
Canadian jurists apply the living tree metaphor not only to changes in fact—as, 
                                                  
185 220 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1 (2002).
186 . ¶ 362.
187 . ¶¶ 347-49. The Supreme Court disagreed with Justice Marshall on appeal, stating 
(without irony) that “the separation of powers cannot be invoked to undermine the operation of a 
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say, even an American originalist might view the application of the First 
Amendment to broadcast television191—but to changes in the meaning of the 
Constitution itself.192
At first blush, the preferred approach of the High Court of Australia to 
interpretation of its constitution is very nearly the mirror image of that of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Both courts began the last century quasi-committed to 
British sovereignty but deeply committed to British modes of statutory 
interpretation. In both countries a seminal Progressive Era judicial decision has 
served as a reference point in most discussions of the degree to which 
constitutional interpretation should be originalist or evolutionary, intentionalist or 
purposive, large and liberal or narrow and conservative. But whereas 
and the living tree metaphor it sprouted represent a departure from Canada’s 
British origins, the case whose principles continue to set the terms of debate in 
Australian constitutional law is rather a symbol of British continuity. Thus, in 
(the 
), Justice Higgins wrote:
The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are 
subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of 
the Parliament that made it; and that intention has to be found by an 
examination of the language used in the statute as a whole. The question 
is, what does the language mean; and when we find what the language 
means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to obey that 
meaning, even if we think the result to be inconvenient or impolitic or 
improbable.193
As I discuss below, the literalist approach taken in the , which 
treats the Australian Constitution like the British statute that it is, was the 
dominant approach of the High Court until Anthony Mason became Chief Judge 
in 1987, roughly coinciding with Australian constitutional sovereignty one year 
earlier. It remains rhetorically potent today. As Brad Selway has written, “In 
contrast to the various divergent approaches that exist in United States 
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jurisprudence, all Australian High Court judges are likely to be viewed as being 
fundamentally texualists.”194
Part of the reason why Australia would have taken to purposive, value-
laden, or evolutionary jurisprudence much later than Canada seems obvious. First, 
Australia lacks a bill of rights. The few enumerated rights in the Australian 
Constitution generally apply only against the federal government;195 adjudicating 
constitutional disputes, much less those involving individual rights, is a relatively 
minor chore for the Court.196 Second, unlike in Canada, the upshot of High Court 
literalism was strong deference to the power of the Commonwealth in federalism 
disputes. Taken in combination, those two considerations suggest a hypothesis: If 
narrow textualism threatened neither the power of the national government nor 
the articulation of rights, it is unclear that it ever would have fallen out of favor in 
either Canada or the United States.
But the case is more complex than that. Australian literalism, “legalism” 
in its more sophisticated and plenary form, is more broadly practiced but less 
reactionary and less historicist than American originalism. As we shall see, 
legalism is an exercise in judgment, not a salve for it.
The Australian Constitution was the product of a domestically convened 
constitutional convention spanning 1897 to 1899 at which each of the six colonies 
was represented. The resulting Constitution was submitted for referendum within 
each colony and was submitted to the Parliament at Westminster for approval in 
1900. The final version was little changed by Parliament and went into effect as 
the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act on January 1, 1901. The 
Constitution established a tripartite federal system of government, with a 
legislative, executive, and judicial branch, although by convention the executive 
is under the control of the national legislature. The principal federalism-related 
                                                  
194 Justice B.M. Selway, 
, 14 PUBLIC L. REV. 234, 239 (2003).
195 The constitutionally enshrined individual rights are the rights to just terms in the event of a 
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provisions are sections 51 and 52, which enumerate the powers of the Parliament, 
and sections 106-120, which include a supremacy clause and a full faith and credit 
clause, and which grant certain affirmative powers and impose certain limitations 
on state governments.
Like the U.S. counterpart on which it was modeled, the Australian 
Constitution does not expressly provide for judicial review, but there is evidence 
that the power to review legislation for constitutionality was assumed.197 The 
High Court is a constitutional creation, its composition and jurisdiction the subject 
of Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The Court began to sit in 1903, when Parliament 
conferred jurisdiction upon it to decide constitutional cases. Its constitutional 
jurisdiction permits it to hear appeals from both lower federal courts and from 
state courts (including state-law issues), although today its jurisdiction is limited 
to discretionary appeals “in cases raising difficult issues of national 
importance.”198
The Constitution also provides for the possibility of appeal to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council.199 Significantly, however, in cases involving an 
federalism question, appeal to the Privy Council from High Court 
decisions originally required certification from the High Court itself.200 The Court 
certified only one question, in 1913,201 before most appeals to the Privy Council 
were abolished in 1968.202 Direct appeals from state courts were not 
constitutionally barred, but the High Court ruled in 1907 that it was not bound by 
any Privy Council decisions on affairs, even when the Committee 
properly had jurisdiction.203 The state-court loophole was subsequently closed 
when the British Parliament provided in 1907 that the High Court’s jurisdiction 
over matters was exclusive of the state supreme courts’.204 As a practical 
matter, then, the Privy Council has had very little effect on the development of 
Australian constitutional law.205
Amendments to the Australian Constitution require passage in Parliament 
and approval through referendum of the majority of voters nationwide and in a 
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majority of the states.206 Although on paper the amendment process is easier than 
in either the United States or Canada, constitutional amendment has not in 
practice been a significant avenue of constitutional revision in Australia.207
The interesting question of the extent to which judges should apply the 
same methods of interpretation to constitutions as to statutes is more interesting 
still in countries with an ongoing tradition of parliamentary supremacy. It may be 
that must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding, but the 
question was more complicated early in Australia’s constitutional history. The 
Australian Constitution is a statute, after all, and not even an Australian statute at 
that. It would have seemed obvious to many turn of the century Commonwealth 
jurists that the text, narrowly construed, fixed the intentions of the British MPs 
whose assent was relevant to the status of the Constitution as law. 
And indeed it was obvious to many. In , the 
High Court was called upon to decide a dispute over customs duties in which it 
was claimed that an ambiguity in one section of the Constitution should be read in 
accordance with common sense rather than so as to conform, arguably absurdly, 
to another section.208 Put another way, by Chief Justice Samuel Griffith, 
We were invited by [Tasmania’s counsel] to apply, in construing 
the Constitution, some higher rule of construction; to look beyond the 
letter of the Constitution; to adopt something which would commend itself 
to our minds as being a principle of abstract justice, and if possible to read 
the Constitution in conformity with that principle.209
Griffith’s words carry special weight in Australia, as he is often described as the 
father of its Constitution, but he was careful to describe the document as an Act of 
Parliament, to which “the same rules of interpretation apply that apply to any 
other written document.”210 Namely, the rules were to be those that the House of 
Lords applies to statutes. First, “they should be construed according to the intent 
of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the Statute are in 
                                                  
206 AU STL. CON ST. § 128.
207 Goldsworthy, note 196, at 109.
208 (1904) 1 C.L.R. 329.
209 . at 338.
210 .






Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.
38
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to 
expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.”211
Second, a court tasked with interpreting either a statute or a constitution 
should not “decide such a question . . . under the influence of considerations of 
policy, except so far as that policy may be apparent from, or at least consistent 
with, the language of the legislature in the Statute or Statutes upon which the 
question depends.”212 The other two judges hearing the Tasmania case, writing
seriatim, agreed with Griffith. Justice Barton wrote:
It would be an enormity to hold that a Judge who thinks that a 
certain course, laid down with apparent clearness in an Act of Parliament, 
is absurd, may use every means to get rid of that literal meaning which, to 
the minds of responsible legislators, who were in an equal position to 
judge of its absurdity, appeared to be reasonable.213
Justice O’Connor added that, in his view, “it [cannot] be too strongly stated that 
our duty in interpreting a Statute is to declare and administer the law according to 
the intention expressed in the Statute itself. In this respect the Constitution differs 
in no way from any Statute of the Commonwealth or of a State.”214
Students of the debate on the modern U.S. Supreme Court over statutory 
interpretation will recognize the voice of Justice Scalia.215 He has also suggested 
that so far as the text is clear, it is a complete statement of legislative intent, for 
“[m]en may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which 
bind us.”216 It has long been thought by most American judges and scholars that 
such a rigid rule of interpretation has no place in constitutional law.217 That 
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suggestion rests on one or both of two assumptions, first, that a constitution meant 
to endure over time cannot possibly specify in advance how it should apply to 
unforeseen circumstances, and second, that a constitution is difficult to amend and 
so must be tethered to the contemporary will of the people in the course of 
judicial review. Accepting the first assumption suggests the “large and liberal” 
interpretation recommended in , and accepting the second means that, 
Chief Justice Griffith, constitutional judges should pay some attention to 
“considerations of policy.” Where the constitution is in fact a statute of a quasi-
foreign sovereign, either assumption rests on shakier footing. A constitution that 
doubles as ordinary legislation might be presumed to lack the intransigence of a 
higher-law document, and one tethered to the will of foreigners 
challenges the democratic premise of the two assumptions. What a foreign 
sovereign giveth it conceivably may take away.
The High Court’s abandonment of special rules of interpretation for the 
Constitution, evidenced in the Tasmania case, was sanctified in the 
. At issue was whether a federal arbitration award could be applied against a 
state. As in the United States during roughly the same era,218 the High Court 
carefully scrutinized the (porous) boundary between interstate and intrastate 
authority in a series of cases during the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
And as in the United States,219 the Court’s federalism decisions were difficult to 
predict in advance. Thus, the Court held in 1904 that the state of Tasmania could 
not tax the salary of a federal officer even though section 107 of the Constitution 
grants the power of taxation to the states and does not expressly limit that 
power.220 Barely a decade later the Court upheld a Queensland statute taxing 
leasehold estates in federal land.221 Both decisions employed the structural, 
purposive, and extratextual reasoning that the sought to end. 
Rather than engage in the guesswork required of such reasoning, Justice Isaacs 
wrote that the Court’s task in constitutional interpretation was “faithfully to 
expound and give effect to [the Constitution] according to its own terms, finding 
the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout 
precisely as framed, clear of any qualifications which the people of the 
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Commonwealth or, at their request, the Imperial Parliament have not thought fit to 
express.”222 The alternative, he said, was “referable to no more definite standard 
than the personal opinion of the judge who declares it.”223
The is an immensely important landmark in Australia’s 
constitutional jurisprudence for two interrelated reasons. First, in upholding the 
federal arbitration award the Court vanquished the concept of implied 
intergovernmental immunities.224 Second, and most germane to our enquiry, the 
case expressly established that interpretation of the Australian Constitution would 
follow a British model of statutory interpretation rather than an American model 
of constitutional interpretation. The High Court would henceforward obey “the 
settled rules of construction which . . . have been very distinctly enunciated by the 
highest tribunals of the [British] Empire.”225 To wit, “[t]he first, and ‘golden rule’ 
or ‘universal rule’” was that judges interpreting a statute should:
[E]xclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the 
law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by 
reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section. 
Subject to this consideration . . . the only safe course is to read the 
language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense.226
Specifically with respect to interpretation of a written Constitution, the 
rule would be:
“
. When the text is , as, for example, 
when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide 
                                                  
222 , 28 C.L.R. at 147.
223 . at 142; . at 145 (saying of the case: “It is an interpretation of the 
Constitution depending on an implication which is formed on a vague, individual conception of 
the spirit of the compact, which is not the result of interpreting any specific language to be quoted, 
nor referable to any recognized principle of the common law of the Constitution, and which, when 
started, is rebuttable by an intention of exclusion equally not referable to any language of the 
instrument or acknowledged common law constitutional principle, but arrived at by the Court on 
the opinions of judges as to hopes and expectations respecting vague external conditions.”).
224 As it did with respect to Canada, the Privy Council tended to favor provincial over national 
rights in federalism cases, , Webb v. Outtrim, [1907] A.C. 81 (P.C.) (appeal taken from 
Vict.) (holding that Commonwealth officers were subject to state income tax), but disempowered 
to review federalism questions, the Committee’s views on the matter were far less relevant 
in Australia.
225 , 28 C.L.R. at 148.
226 . at 149 (quoting , [1913] A.C. 107, 113 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. & 
Wales) (U.K.) (Haldane, L.C.)).
Engineers Case
[I]f the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it 
directs and what it forbids ambiguous
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enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had to 
the context and scheme of the Act.”227
Put differently, interpretation of the Australian Constitution would be by 
reference to its plain text, structure, and statutory context. In the service of 
judicial restraint, any reference to the intentions of the drafters was strictly 
forbidden.
Variants on this approach to constitutional interpretation go by various 
names around the world—originalism being one of them—but Australians call it 
legalism. And it has had a distinguished pedigree since the . At his 
1952 swearing-in as Chief Justice of the High Court, Owen Dixon said, “It may 
be that the court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should be sorry to think 
that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide to judicial decisions in great 
conflicts than a strict and complete legalism.”228 From the time of the 
roughly until Australian constitutional sovereignty, it was orthodoxy on the 
High Court to interpret the Constitution according to the “ordinary or technical 
meaning” of the text, to refuse to expand or limit that meaning by reference to the 
purpose of a given provision or of the Constitution as a whole, and to “accept[] 
that, unless formally amended, the words of the Constitution continue to mean 
what they meant in 1900.”229
That is not to say that the Australian Constitution is wholly impervious to 
technological innovation or changes in social fact. The Court has held and 
continues to maintain that “[t]he connotation of words employed in the 
Constitution does not change though changing events and attitudes may in some 
                                                  
227 . at 150 (quoting , [1912] A.C. 571, 583 (P.C.) (appeal taken from 
Can.) (Loreburn, L.C.)).
228 Swearing In of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice of the High Court, 85 C.L.R. xi, xiv (1952). 
. SC ALIA, note 11, at 25 (“Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most 
mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, ! The rule of law 
is form.”).
229 Goldsworthy, note 196, at 121-22, 136; Attorney-General v. Commonwealth, (1981) 
146 C.L.R. 559, 614-15 (Mason, J.) (“[A] constitutional prohibition must be applied in accordance 
with the meaning which it had in 1900.”); Commonwealth v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), 
(1983) 158 C.L.R. 1, 127 (“[M]ere expectations held in 1900 could not form a satisfactory basis 
for departing from the natural interpretation of words used in the Constitution.”); S. Australia v. 
Commonwealth (First Uniform Tax Case), (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373 (upholding a federal taxation 
scheme whose obvious purpose and effect was to deprive states of their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to impose income taxes); Craven, note 6, at 171 (“[T]he dominant 
interpretative ideology of the Court has been, at least since , some variant of more or 
less strict legalism.”); David Tucker, 
, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 567, 579-80 (1991) 
(“[T]he ‘take-the-accepted-meaning of a term’ rule of interpretation adopted in has 
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circumstances extend the denotation or reach of those words.”230 The High Court 
has frequently relied upon the distinction between the “connotation” of the 
Constitution’s text—its meaning as of 1900—and its “denotation”—the category 
of objects to which that meaning applies.231 Justice Dawson has said that the 
Court’s idiosyncratic usage derives from that of John Stuart Mill, who in 
described a “connotative term” as “one which denotes a subject, and 
implies an attribute,” as “white” might denote the color of snow.232 As used on the 
High Court, the distinction parallels the familiar distinction in American 
constitutional theory between original semantic meaning and original expected 
application.233 So just as an American originalist might allow that the Fourth 
Amendment forbids wiretapping,234 the High Court held in 1935 that radio 
broadcasts constitute “telephonic, telegraphic and other like services” while 
admitting no embarrassment to its legalist credentials.235 As if to prove the 
resiliency of those credentials, however, the Court held in 1972 that section 41 of 
the Constitution, which guarantees the franchise in federal elections to “adult 
persons” who may vote in state elections, only applies to those who were 
considered adults in 1901— , 21-year-olds—not to those who are of adult age 
under current state law.236
On its face, then, Australian legalism appears to mirror the form of 
originalism promoted by Justice Scalia, mapped onto the entire Court.237 Like 
Justice Scalia in statutory cases, the pre-1986 High Court refused outright to 
consult legislative debates either to reveal legislative purpose or as an aid in 
                                                  
230 King v. Jones, (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221, 229 (Barwick, C.J.).
231 , Queen v. Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Comm’n; ex parte Prof. 
Engineers Ass’n, (1959) 107 C.L.R. 208, 267 (Windeyer, J.) (“The denotation of words becomes 
enlarged as new things falling within their connotations come into existence or become known.”); 
Street v. Queensl. Bar Ass’n, (1989) 168 C.L.R. 461, 538 (Dawson, J.) (listing cases).
232 JOHN STU AR T MILL , A SYSTEM O F LO GIC: RAC ION ATIVE AND INDUC TIVE 31 (1875); , 
168 C.L.R. at  537 (Dawson, J).
233 note 18, ; Christopher Birch, 
, 5 J. APP . PRAC. & PROCESS, 445, 466-67 (2003); Tucker, note 
229, at 585-86; In re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 552 (McHugh, 
J.) (referring to Dworkin’s distinction between concepts and conceptions).
234 , BORK, note 19, at 168.
235 The King v. Brislan; Ex parte Williams, (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262.
236 King v. Jones, (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221.
237 Tucker, note 229, at 581. One way in which High Court orthodoxy departs 
dramatically from Justice Scalia is in its regard for . Prior to the mid-1980s the Court, 
true to English tradition, regarded even wrongly decided precedent as nearly unimpeachable, 
whereas Justice Scalia tends to view it as a necessary evil. JASON L. P IERCE, INSID E THE 
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ascertaining the contemporaneous meaning of the text.238 Even when the Court 
finally reversed its blanket rule, it said that it would thereafter refer to legislative 
debates “not for the purpose of substituting for the meaning of the words used the 
scope and effect—if such could be established—which the founding fathers 
subjectively intended the section to have, but for the purpose of identifying the 
contemporary meaning of language used [and] the subject to which that language 
was directed.”239 Likewise, Justice Scalia has suggested that ratification history 
may assist the originalist judge in ascertaining the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s text.240
As we shall see, however, the High Court’s consideration of Convention 
debates, which has increased dramatically in the years since constitutional 
sovereignty,241 is of a different order than Justice Scalia’s use of ratification 
history to divine original meaning. The Great Divide in Australia is not between 
original meaning and current meaning but between original meaning and original 
intent. Use of legislative debates, then, represents a momentous departure from 
orthodox Australian legalism. In combination with other innovations of the 
Mason Court, the turn to extrinsic evidence has contributed to a palpable tension 
between the Court’s legalist tradition and its potentially purposive future.
Like Canada and New Zealand, Australia became fully patriated in the 
1980s. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 had liberated the Commonwealth to 
legislate extraterritorially and ended the repugnancy doctrine, whereby Australian 
laws would be invalidated if they conflicted with United Kingdom law. But, with 
consent, the British Parliament still had authority to legislate for Australia, and the 
states remained bound by the repugnancy and extraterritoriality doctrines. 
Moreover, as of the 1980s the Privy Council still had the constitutional power to 
adjudicate appeals from the Supreme Courts of the various states. That all ended 
with the Australia Act 1986. The Act, which comprised joint statutes of the 
British and Australian Parliaments, effectively severed all remaining legal ties 
between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.242
                                                  
238 Goldsworthy, note 196, at 123-24; , A-G ex rel Black v. Commonwealth, 
(1981) 146 C.L.R. 559; A-G (Cth); ex rel McKinlay v. Commonwealth, (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1.
239 Cole v. Whitfield, (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360, 385.
240 SC ALIA, note 11, at 38; note 164 and accompanying text.
241 Goldsworthy, note 196, at 127.
242 Some nominal ties remain. For example, the Queen of England wields formal executive 
authority, although that authority is legally independent of her role as head of the British 
monarchy. Also, the text of the Australian Constitution, § 74, still permits appeals to the Privy 
Council upon certification by the High Court, but that provision has been officially ruled a dead 
letter. Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises (No 2), (1985) 159 C.L.R. 461. 
3. The Mason Court Revolution
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Australian constitutional independence nearly perfectly coincided with the 
ascendancy of Anthony Mason to the position of Chief Justice of the High Court 
in 1987. Mason had not been thought a particularly reform-minded jurist during 
his 15 years on the High Court prior to his tenure as Chief Justice, but his impact 
as Chief is perhaps best expressed by political scientist Jason Pierce’s conclusion 
based on more than 80 interviews with Australian appellate judges: “Australia’s 
appellate judges tend to speak in ‘then and now’ terms regarding the High Court, 
such that the ‘then’ encompassed the years from federation to the mid-1980s, 
while the ‘now’ meant the years since the mid-1980s.’”243 According to Mason’s 
former colleague Justice McHugh, Mason viewed constitutional sovereignty as 
more than simply a change in the formal status of the Commonwealth’s 
relationship with the United Kingdom but rather as a mandate to conceptualize 
constitutional interpretation and rights-formation in broader terms.244
With the help of relatively reform-minded colleagues such as William 
Deane, Mary Gaudron, and John Toohey, Mason inaugurated a departure from the 
strict legalism associated with the and with Chief Justice 
Dixon.245 Mason, Deane, and Gaudron had all been educated at the University of 
Sydney, where, according to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, they were exposed to “more 
pragmatic, consequentialist legal theories” than many of their predecessors.246
Accordingly, the Mason Court was more willing to engage in purposive analysis; 
more willing to find implied rights within the constitutional structure; more 
willing to allow for constitutional evolution; and increasingly likely to look to 
transnational sources for constitutional wisdom.
In a speech given one year before he became Chief Justice, Mason 
announced what he perceived to be an emerging trend in Australian constitutional 
law, namely a “move[] away from ‘strict and complete legalism’ and toward a 
more policy oriented constitutional interpretation.”247 Most would agree that the 
statement was more predictive than descriptive. Two years later, in its unanimous 
per curiam in , the case in which the Court explicitly abandoned 
its rule against reference to Convention debates, the Court warned of “the hazards 
of seeking certainty of operation of a constitutional guarantee through the medium 
of an artificial formula. Either the formula is consistently applied and subverts the 
substance of the guarantee; or an attempt is made to achieve uniformly 
                                                  
243 PIERCE, note 237, at 42; Goldsworthy, note 196, at 144 (“It is generally 
agreed that in the late 1980s, the Court took a new direction, adopting a more purposive and even 
creative approach in constitutional and other cases.”).
244 Michael McHugh, , 30 
SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 6 (2008) (“[Mason] regarded Australia’s evolving status as an independent 
nation as inevitably requiring a change in the approach of High Court justices to judging.”).
245 PIERCE, note 237, at 208-09.
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Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.
45
satisfactory outcomes and the formula becomes uncertain in its application.”248
Sophisticated observers recognized the announcement of a more open embrace of 
policy-balancing and purposive interpretation.249 And indeed the decision itself 
held that section 92 of the Constitution—providing that “[o]n the imposition of 
uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, . . 
. shall be absolutely free”250—does not quite mean what it says. The Court held 
that Convention debates revealed that the purpose behind the provision was not to 
allow “anarchy” in trade but to prevent “discriminatory burdens of a protectionist 
kind.”251 In limiting the text of section 92 to the scope consistent with its 
historical purpose, the Court overruled some 127 cases and, it should be noted, 
took the Stevens side of the interpretive debate at the heart of .252
There was much more to the Mason Court revolution. As discussed above, 
Australia’s Constitution guarantees precious few individual rights. But Lionel 
Murphy’s appointment to the Court in 1975 produced consistent calls for 
recognizing a variety of implied constitutional rights, most prominently including 
the right to political communication.253 The argument, very much in the spirit of 
Charles Black, was that the Constitution’s provisions for parliamentary elections 
and representative state governments implied a basic freedom to express political 
ideas.254 , involving a prosecution for a television 
station’s use of an unauthorized transmitter for an interstate broadcast, presented 
the Court with an opportunity to declare such an implied right in 1986. Justice 
Murphy reiterated his view that such a right exists but the other six Justices 
resolved the case on alternative grounds.255
Six years later, however, following constitutional sovereignty, five 
Justices were prepared to announce an implied freedom of political 
communication. Wrote Justice Brennan in , “Freedom of 
public discussion of government (including the institutions and agencies of 
                                                  
248 Cole v. Whitfield, (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360, 402; . BIC KEL, note 9, at 95-96 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court should not give affirmative sanction to the actions of the political branches 
except when consistent with principle).
249 Dan Meagher, , 7 
DEAK IN L. REV. 261, 262 (2002) (calling a “mortal blow” to literalism); Leslie Zines, 
, 5 CONST. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 24 
(2002).
250 AU STL. CON ST. § 92.
251 , 165 C.L.R. at 394.
252 The number of overruled cases comes from McHugh, note 244, at 12.
253 AU STR ALIAN CONSTITU TION AL LAW AND THEO R Y 1159 (Tony Blackshield & George 
Williams eds., 3d ed., 2002.).
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government) is not merely a desirable political privilege; it is inherent in the idea 
of a representative democracy.”256 In the companion case of 
, Chief Justice Mason acknowledged that the 
founding generation had deliberately omitted judicially enforceable individual 
rights from the Constitution, preferring to leave rights enforcement to the 
principle of responsible government.257 Crucially, however, that decision was 
made before 1986, which “marked the end of the legal sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament and recognized that ultimate sovereignty resided in the Australian 
people.”258 Under the new populist order, parliamentary representatives “are 
accountable to the people for what they do and have a responsibility to take 
account of the views of the people on whose behalf they act. . . . Indispensable to 
that responsibility is freedom of communication, at least in relation to public 
affairs and political discussion.”259 The implication was that the right did not exist 
on the day of federation but arose incident to the sort of democracy the Australian 
nation had become.
The cat thus out of the bag, the Court wielded the right of political 
communication to erect a constitutional defense to defamation in 
.260 And in , three Justices were of 
the view that the Constitution contained an implied individual right to equal 
treatment under the law.261 To an American audience the hue and cry the Court’s 
implied freedoms cases sparked in Australian legal circles will seem like much 
ado about very little. But against the backdrop of Australian legal norms, judicial 
creativity of this sort was exceptionally rare prior to constitutional independence.
In addition to engaging more frequently in purposive analysis and 
occasionally finding implied individual rights in the Constitution, the Mason 
Court was more openly willing to allow that the Constitution may adapt to 
changed circumstances. The boundary between connotation and denotation has 
never been airtight, and many Australian court watchers believe that even the 
                                                  
256 (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1, 48 (Brennan, J.); . at 72 (Deane & Toohey, JJ.) (“The people of 
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committed legalist has often been able to squeeze his way through just fine.262 But 
in select cases the Mason Court was unusually open about constitutional updating.
Thus, in , the Court had to decide 
whether the State of Queensland could restrict bar admission to state residents, 
notwithstanding sections 92 and 117 of the Constitution, which generally prohibit 
interstate discrimination.263 The Court had held in a prior case, , 
that those constitutional provisions did not apply because the challenged statute 
did not require anyone to abandon her domicile.264 Following the pre-Mason 
Court preference for formal rules over balancing tests, the Court held 
moreover that the discriminatory character of a state law should be determined by 
its formal operation rather than by its practical effect.265 The High Court reversed 
outright, with Chief Justice Mason writing that “[i]t would make 
little sense to deal with laws which have a discriminatory purpose and leave 
untouched laws which have a discriminatory effect.”266 It had long been thought 
that permitting judges to look beyond the face of a statute to its actual operation 
would interfere with legislative prerogatives and destabilize constitutional 
interpretation: a statute thought constitutional at time T0 could become 
unconstitutional at time T1, solely through judicial assessment of social facts.
267
The Court expressed no such concern in .
More recently, in , the Court held that British subjects were 
citizens of a “foreign power” under section 44(i) of the Constitution and therefore 
could not be members of Parliament.268 The controversy stems from the fact that 
the United Kingdom was not a foreign power in 1901. The Court’s lead opinion
stated that “[w]hilst the text of the Constitution has not changed, its operation has. 
. . . The Constitution speaks to the present and its interpretation takes account of 
and moves with these developments.”269 Notably, the Court said so without any 
reference to its connotation-denotation distinction, which seems a natural fit for 
the case. This language was sufficiently alarming that Justice Callinan, who voted 
to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds, wrote a concurring opinion in which 
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he called into question the petitioner’s “evolutionary theory” of the case as 
introducing too much uncertainty into the law.270
Relying upon among other cases, Justice Michael Kirby has 
articulated what he calls a “living force” theory that, as of 2000, he believed was 
“gradually emerging as the theory proper to the construction of the 
Constitution.”271 Kirby suggests that High Court case law over the last two 
decades is slowly conforming to the view of constitutional interpretation held by 
Andrew Inglis Clark, a leader in the Australian federation movement who also 
happened to be an expert on the U.S. Constitution and a friend of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.272 His writings on Australian interpretation resembled Holmes’s later 
opinion in :
The social conditions and the political exigencies of the succeeding 
generations of every civilized and progressive community will inevitably 
produce new governmental problems to which the language of the 
Constitution must be applied, and hence it must be read and construed, not 
as containing a declaration of the will and intentions of men long since 
dead . . . but as declaring the will and intentions of the present inheritors 
and possessors of sovereign power, who maintain the Constitution and 
have the power to alter it, and who are in the immediate presence of the 
problems to be solved. It is they who enforce the provisions of the 
Constitution and make a living force of that which would otherwise be a 
silent and lifeless document.273
Three different Justices, including Kirby himself, have cited favorably to Clark’s 
“living force” theory in High Court opinions, although as I discuss below it does 
not command a majority on the current Court.274
The final piece to the Mason Court’s constitutional law revolution—in 
addition to purposive analysis, recognition of implied constitutional rights, and 
explicitly evolutionary jurisprudence—is incorporation of transnational legal 
sources into Australian constitutional law. Given that Australia was only quasi-
sovereign at federation and modeled its Constitution expressly on that of the 
United States, it is to be expected that reference to foreign law has a long pedigree 
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in Australian jurisprudence.275 But citations to cases of foreign nations other than 
the United Kingdom accelerated dramatically in the 1980s. American cases, for 
example, were cited in 13 percent of High Court decisions in the 1970s, compared 
to 25 percent in the 1980s and 41 percent in the 1990s. Canadian cases were cited 
in just 10 percent of High Court decisions in the 1970s, but 21 percent in the 
1980s and 37 percent in the 1990s.276 Cases from the constitutional courts of 
South Africa, New Zealand, and India are also much more frequently cited than in 
years past, as are international conventions and legal norms.277
American originalists are apt to point out that reference to contemporary 
foreign and international law to define the substance and scope of constitutional 
provisions is difficult to reconcile with traditional forms of originalism.278 But in 
, for example, several High Court Justices 
articulated limitations on the implied freedom of political communication by 
reference to precedents of the United States Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights rather than to any original understanding particular to the 
Australian tradition.279 Where aids to interpretation once could not be extrinsic to 
the text of the Constitution, they now may be extrinsic to the Commonwealth 
itself.
Controversy has attended virtually all of the changes introduced during 
Chief Justice Mason’s tenure. Few would doubt, moreover, that the Court 
backtracked, arguably a great deal, during the recent tenure of Murray Gleeson as 
Chief Justice. Gleeson was a classmate of former Liberal Party Prime Minister 
John Howard’s at the University of Sydney, and Howard appointed Gleeson to the 
Chief Justiceship in 1998. Australia’s Liberal Party is misleadingly named, as its 
liberalism is more Friedman than Rawls: it is associated with laissez faire 
economics and social conservatism. Gleeson brought that conservatism with him 
to the High Court. Directly contrary to the themes of the Mason Court, Gleeson 
has written that “the members of the Court are expected to approach their task by 
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the application of what Sir Owen Dixon described as ‘a strict and complete 
legalism.’”280
Gleeson’s account is hortatory. The battle for the soul of the High Court 
over the last decade has been open and notorious. The Court’s conservatives, in 
the persons of Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan, have sought to curtail 
much of the discretion inherent in the Mason Court reforms, while more liberal 
members, Justice Kirby most persistently, have sought instead to broaden it. 
is emblematic.281 Section 51(xix) of the Constitution empowers 
Parliament to legislate with respect to “naturalization and aliens.”282 Tania Singh 
was born in Australia to undocumented Indian parents. Although Australia does 
not confer automatic birthright citizenship, Singh argued that she was 
nevertheless not an “alien” and therefore could not be deported pursuant to a 
statute enacted under the authority of section 51(xix).
Chief Justice Gleeson’s opinion in includes a lengthy discourse, far 
longer than any in the U.S. Reports, on the nature of constitutional interpretation. 
It should by now be clear that such discourse is not unusual in High Court 
opinions, which are issued seriatim and are therefore more personal than the 
typically antiseptic majority opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Gleeson’s view 
is an orthodox originalist one: “Judicial review of the validity of legislative action 
by reference to the Constitution is conducted upon the hypothesis that the terms, 
express and implied, of a written instrument, brought into existence more than a 
century ago, bind present and future parliaments, and courts.”283 The meaning of 
those terms would be determined not by modern exigencies but by “the 
contemporary meaning of the language used in 1900.”284 Here, it was clear to 
Gleeson that as of 1900 the Parliament had the authority to determine the scope of 
alienage and not merely of citizenship. Concurring, Justice Callinan warned 
against overuse of the connotation-denotation distinction: “Judges should in my 
opinion be especially vigilant to recognise and eschew what is in substance a 
constitutional change under a false rubric of a perceived change in the meaning of 
a word, or an expression used in the Constitution.”285
Justice Kirby agreed with Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan in 
result but engaged them directly on constitutional interpretation. He referred to 
the theory that constitutional text should receive “the same meaning and intent 
with which [the Constitution] spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, 
and was voted on and adopted by the people,” and placed those words in the 
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mouth of Chief Justice Taney in .286 Because a constitution 
must endure through the ages, Kirby said, “the ambit of the power [of 
interpretation] is not limited by the wishes, expectations or imagination of the 
framers. They did not intend, nor did they enjoy the power, to impose their wishes 
and understanding of the text upon later generations of Australians.”287 Justice 
Kirby ultimately concluded that Parliament had the power to declare Singh an 
alien, but he did so by reference to the chameleonic nature of the term “alien;” to 
international law norms of dual and birthright citizenship; to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; to precedent; and to potential policy 
consequences.288
These battle lines recur elsewhere. In , 
decided in the brief interregnum between the Mason and Gleeson Courts,289
Justice McHugh and Justice Toohey jousted over whether a freestanding principle 
of representative democracy underlies the Constitution and may be given dynamic 
content by judges.290 In , Justice McHugh and 
Justice Kirby locked horns over the role convenience and policy should play in 
determining whether Parliament had the power to vest jurisdiction in federal 
courts to decide issues of state law, a matter on which the Constitution is silent.291
In and , both criminal procedure 
cases, Justices McHugh and Kirby were at it again, delivering lengthy and 
detailed opinions on the relative merits of originalism and “living force” 
constitutionalism.292 In each of those cases, the “living force” view was in dissent, 
leading most observers to conclude that the Gleeson Court had successfully 
reinvigorated Australian legalism.293
Reinvigorated but not reinaugurated. All that is orthodox on the High 
Court today is that, relative to the past, little is orthodox. The lasting legacy of the 
Mason Court is not that it made Australian constitutional interpretation purposive 
but that it made it, like ours, pluralistic. Throughout his battles with Justice Kirby, 
Justice McHugh maintained that the High Court employs the many tools available 
to common law judges in its constitutional decisions:
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The common law constitutional method is a house of many rooms.
It emphasizes text and the drawing of constitutional implications from the 
text and structure of the Constitution. It relies heavily on previous 
authorities and the doctrines associated with those authorities. It uses 
history, particularly for ascertaining the purpose of particular 
constitutional provisions. But it recognises that none of these tools—
including textual analysis—may be decisive. . . . And since the beginning 
of the Mason Court, where the constitutional text is not compelling, as is 
often the case, it takes into account conflicting social interests, values and 
policies in seeking to give the Constitution a construction that accords 
with the needs of contemporary Australia.294
This approach has become relatively common ground among High Court 
Justices.295 Recognition of its own pluralism brings the Court into line with much 
of the world,296 but it represents monumentally different rhetoric from what 
prevailed two decades ago.297 The Court as a whole remains more enamored of 
text and original meaning than a typical European, Canadian, or even American 
jurist, but its originalism is, as Justice McHugh has said, “faint-hearted.”298 It is 
text-focused but not fetishistic; it is able to accommodate extrinsic evidence and 
willing openly to consider the policy implications of a too-literal reading of the 
document.299
* * *
Australian jurists have long been and to a great extent remain “originalist.” 
The reaction of the Australian bench to the Mason Court revolution has been stark 
and, in significant respects, negative. Pierce’s study begins with an accounting of 
some of the colorful adjectives used by the judges he interviewed to describe the 
Mason Court: “hyperactive,” “adventurous,” “incomparably activist,” “composed 
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of judicial legislators,” “controlled by Jacobins,” “under the influence of left-wing 
theorists,” “deciding cases as Marx or Freud would have,” and “overcome with 
delusions of grandeur.”300 It is my impression as an American constitutional 
scholar that the rhetoric in U.S. legal circles is less heated, even though the 
Supreme Court itself is less text-bound, more creative, and more pluralistic than 
the High Court of Australia.
As I discussed in Part II.B.2, however, the Great Divide in Australia is 
different than it is here. American scholars, not to mention the lay public, tend to 
lump together original intent and original meaning as two different ways of 
practicing a methodology whose essential features they share: attention to a fixed 
historical meaning as a tool for restraining judges. History is linked to judicial 
restraint. But it is recognized (and feared) in Australia that history can do much 
more than that. It can provide clues as to original purposes and expectations, can 
alter both the connotation and the denotation of constitutional text, and can even 
change the holistic purposes of constitutionalism itself. In that sense, history can 
be generative rather than constraining. As Justice McHugh has written, even the 
conservative Gleeson Court “has seen constitutional history as an ongoing 
narrative. On this view, the state of the law in 1900 provides context, but it is not 
an interpretative straitjacket.”301 And even on the orthodox legalist view dominant 
prior to the Mason Court, restraint was achieved not through a focus on history—
which is extrinsic and contestable—but by a focus on text and on existing 
doctrine.302 is not a pragmatic exception to Australian legalism but 
lies at its core. That is, the view is Burkean, not Scalian.
We have, then, a not insignificant paradox. Many sober and respectable 
academic theorists, judges, and ordinary citizens of the United States find 
originalism a tidy, even compelling response to the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
Yet hardly any sober or respectable foreign nation, our closest cousins included, 
boasts a similar mass of opinion in favor of American-style originalism. Even in 
other democratic nations with long traditions of constitutional judicial review, 
with deep common law roots, and with difficult processes of constitutional 
amendment, resistance to judicial activism does not commingle with historical 
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fetishism. The wisdom of crowds is no help here: it damns equally the notions 
that originalism is either uniquely suited to judicial review of a written 
constitution in a democracy or is, in short, bunk.303
The paradox recommends an answer, namely that the measure of 
originalism’s success lies not in originalism but in ourselves. Aspects of our 
history and political culture are apt to heighten our sensitivity to the historicist 
appeals that characterize the originalism movement of the last three decades. This 
Part suggests six hypotheses that help to explain the origins of Our Originalism. 
First, I argue that the passage of time, in combination with our revolutionary 
history, indoctrinates a filiopietistic attitude toward the founding generation.304
Second, I suggest that our revolutionary political origins also focus constitutional 
interpretive attention on that era to an extent not possible in Canada or Australia. 
Third, we remain in the grips of an anti-rights backlash that is directly responsive 
to the perceived excesses of the Warren Court. Fourth, our public participates 
more directly in the selection of judges to the constitutional court than either 
Canada’s or Australia’s, which can encourage appeals to populism and 
demagoguery. Fifth, relative to Canada (but not Australia) we tend to emphasize a 
monolithic vision of the political order that is hospitable to originalism. Finally, a 
suspicion of evolution and an embrace of the binding authority of sacred texts is a 
prominent feature of our religious culture.
I use the term “origins” guardedly. It is not to be confused with “causes” 
or “requisites.” It is worth repeating that this is not a scientific enquiry, and it is 
not amenable to the scientific method. The question this Article seeks to answer is 
one not of causation but of influence and association. Consider by analogy the 
origins of a cold. We may identify risks—insufficient hand-washing; hanging 
around toddlers; overexhaustion; and so forth—but the actual operation of the 
virus may remain elusive.
In November 2008 the American Constitution Society sponsored a 
conference called “The Second Founding and the Reconstruction Amendments: 
Toward a More Perfect Union.” The mission statement for the conference 
observed that “[i]n current legal debates, many invoke ‘the founding’ of the 
Constitution yet focus only on the eighteenth-century framing, and ignore the 
significant changes to our country and our Constitution wrought by the Civil 
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War.”305 Less charitably, Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie is said to 
have told a New Zealand conference that “the approach of [his] counterparts in 
the United States could only be explained by appreciating that Americans were 
engaged in a ritual of ancestor worship.”306
It is beyond any doubt that Americans revere the Washingtons, Jeffersons, 
Hamiltons, and Madisons of the founding generation. There are many 
explanations for this, but one is the passage of time itself.307 That generation 
created a nation that, nominally at least, has endured for more than 230 years and 
has enabled us to breathe what Charles Black called “the sweet air of 
legitimacy.”308 Meese began his July 1985 speech to the ABA with the 
declaration that “[w]e Americans rightly pride ourselves on having produced the 
greatest political wonder of the world—a government of laws and not of men.”309
Meese’s pride emanates from the durability of the American experiment: The 
passage of time canonizes the ideas and historical figures of the founding era. So 
Justice Scalia may say, and indeed may believe, that he so frequently refers to 
because it is emblematic of contemporaneous usage of constitutional 
text, but it is more significant that he is availing himself of the rhetorical purchase 
the views of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay confer. 
As the mission of the Second Founding Conference suggests, American 
jurists often emphasize narratives of continuity with the Founding Era even when 
Reconstruction narratives of conflict are more compelling. In 
, for example, the allegedly libelous statements at issue targeted Southern 
resistance against the efforts of the civil rights movement to redeem the promise 
of the Reconstruction Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment is the vehicle 
through which the First Amendment applies to the states. Yet the Court made no 
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reference to Reconstruction, instead resting its historical argument for a 
heightened standard for libel of public officials on Madison’s and Jefferson’s 
opposition to the Sedition Acts.310 Grounding the authority of originalism in a 
conception of the framers as uniquely “wise and farsighted,” what Michael Dorf 
has labeled “heroic originalism,”311 evokes a certain sense of national pride. As 
Vicki Jackson writes, “Given the impoverished discourse and absence of visible 
public virtues of self-restraint in today’s national elected politics, a choice that is 
expressed as being between the ‘Founding Fathers’ and anyone living today 
makes it likely that nostalgia will trump.”312
There are a number of obstacles to peoples of other nations viewing their 
framers in this way. For one thing, the constitutions of countries like Germany 
and Japan were forcibly imposed from without,313 and in the case of Canada and 
Australia, the framers were subjects of the British Crown and did not enjoy formal 
lawmaking authority. But historical distance itself is also of some consequence. 
Those who promote originalism in the United States were not present at the 
founding, were not privy to the compromises that generated the Constitution’s 
text, and did not know the framers personally. By contrast, many of the current 
Justices on the Canadian Supreme Court are old enough to have had personal 
relationships with the people who crafted the Charter and find it “hard to imagine 
present-day political leaders possessing the unimpeachable political wisdom that 
some might be disposed to attribute to more ancient constitution-makers.”314
Recall, for example, the dismissive attitude the Supreme Court of Canada took 
toward the drafters of the fundamental justice provision of the Charter in the 
.315 Canadian Justices are also able to rely on 
contemporaneous knowledge that the Charter was originally expected, by many at 
least, to be interpreted progressively.316 It is more difficult to make originalist 
arguments when there is persuasive evidence that the framers were not 
originalists.317
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It is furthermore difficult to discern, even in principle, who constitute the 
framers of the Constitution Act, 1982. Although it is fair to call Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau the most significant motivating force behind Canadian patriation, 
the Constitution Act, 1982 itself owes its present form to a series of negotiations 
among numerous federal and provincial ministers, a parliamentary committee,
and a multitude of interest groups. “The interests represented covered a wide 
spectrum,” Peter Russell writes of this last category. It included “native peoples, 
the multicultural community, women, religions, business, labor, the disabled, gays 
and lesbians, trees, and a number of civil liberties organizations. Most of those 
who appeared pressed for a stronger Charter of Rights, and a number of them 
actually saw their ideas adopted.”318 The fiction that all of these disparate groups 
aligned on a single understanding of much of anything in the Charter is too 
fantastic for most judges to entertain, much less those who lived through the 
drafting process.
The outright hostility of early Australian justices to references to the 
Convention debates might also be explained in part by the fact that they 
themselves were participants in those debates. Justice Kirby writes: “They 
remembered. They did not need to be reminded, least of all of the words of other 
delegates, some of whom they may have held in low regard.”319 Former Chief 
Justice Mason observed on the eve of constitutional sovereignty that criticizing 
the Constitution as anachronistic—“as a product of the horse and buggy age”—
was a vibrant political strategy in Australia but not in the United States.320 As I 
discuss below, that sentiment is no doubt related to the fact that the Australian 
Constitution was, in meaningful ways, not fully Australian. But it is also the 
product of a particular moment in Australia’s political time. 
Our own reverence for the eighteenth-century founding is likewise 
temporally contingent. It is worth remembering that much of the twentieth century 
was hardly the best of times for the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Scholars 
such as Charles Beard and Arthur Schlesinger sought to dismantle the idea that 
the framers deserved particular reverence.321 As Martin Flaherty writes, “For the 
Progressives, American constitutional claims were more than erroneous or even 
irrelevant. They were deceitful.”322 Reframing the framers as fundamentally 
committed to popular sovereignty and classical liberalism, achieved in part 
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through the efforts of scholars like Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood and Akhil 
Amar, was no doubt helpful to the revitalization of American originalism.323
The prime location of the founding generation within the American ethos 
has been consecrated not only by time but, of course, by deeds. The dominant
narrative of American constitutionalism is that the sovereignty of the American 
people was established through force of arms during the American Revolution 
and was consummated through the drafting of an enduring Constitution. That 
Constitution is, moreover, both a locus for popular sovereignty and a distinctly 
political site for American identity.324 Jed Rubenfeld has contrasted the 
“democratic constitutionalism” of the United States with the “international 
constitutionalism” of many European states.325 American sovereignty is bound up 
with its Constitution, and its national identity is notionally stated in political 
rather than ancestral terms.326 The revolution that produced that sovereignty and 
that political identity is dated.
The absence of a comparable moment of sovereignty has been a source of 
considerable angst in Canadian and Australian political and legal circles. 
Canadian legal scholar Peter Russell’s book, 
, was written in 2004, more than two 
decades after, by all appearances, Canada became formally sovereign. Yet, 
Canadian sovereignty is an ongoing process that began before 1867 and continues 
to this day. Russell begins his book with a quote from a letter written by three of 
the fathers of the BNA Act: “It will be observed that the basis of Confederation 
now proposed differs from that of the United States in several important 
particulars. It does not profess to be derived from the people but would be the 
constitution provided by the imperial parliament, thus remedying any defect.”327
Russell later observes that the constitutional vision underlying the BNA Act was 
Burkean rather than Lockean. It was conceived “not as a single foundational 
document drawn up at a particular point in time containing all of a society’s rules 
and principles of government, but as a collection of laws, institutions, and 
political practices that have passed the test of time and which have been found to 
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serve the society’s interests tolerably well.”328 It was sober rather than airy; 
practical rather than aspirational; secular rather than mystical; thick rather than 
thin, in the parlance of Mark Tushnet.329 Moreover it was, formally speaking, 
British rather than Canadian.330 Such a document is hardly likely to inspire a 
popular politics of originalism.331
Quite the opposite in fact. The living tree analogy was part of Lord 
Sankey’s project of freeing the Canadian Parliament from the vise of the Privy 
Council. Canadian sovereignty has long been identified with a metaphor of 
evolution and growth, as opposed to the “frozen concepts” approach of Lord 
Atkin.332 The Charter, though rights-oriented, continues to be understood in that 
spirit. More than just progressive constitutional doctrine, the living tree, 
rhetorically, holds out the promise of self-government.
One could tell a similar story about Australia. Its Constitution, though 
inspired by a domestic political movement, was negotiated in London and was 
formally enacted by the British Parliament. Justice Kirby has said that “[t]wenty 
or 30 years ago, especially in legal circles, the ultimate foundation of the 
legitimacy and binding force of the Constitution was given, virtually without 
dissent, as the Act of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster.”333 It should not be 
surprising, then, that the Mason Court’s impatience with originalism coincided 
with Australian constitutional independence. Writes Mason himself, “[T]he 
legislation that terminated Australia’s residual constitutional links with the United 
Kingdom . . . now provides a firmer foundation for the view that the status of the 
Constitution as a fundamental law springs from the authority of the Australian 
people.”334
Australia’s discomfort with originalism came far later in time and in far 
milder form, of course, than that of the Supreme Court of Canada. For this it is 
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tempting to blame, , the relatively diminished role of the Privy Council 
in Australia’s affairs, but the story may be more complicated. The 
historical Australian Constitution is not wholly without democratic purchase in 
Australia. It was drafted and de facto ratified by Australians and, unlike the BNA 
Act, was designed to serve as a popular Constitution.335 Its preamble refers to “the 
people” of its various states and describes the Commonwealth as 
“indissoluble.”336 Like the U.S. Constitution, it was “not merely a text but a 
deed—a .”337 It might be useful to describe Australia as having not 
one but two moments of sovereignty, the first in 1900 and the second in 1986. 
The competing narratives of the Gleeson Court were a struggle over which of 
these moments deserved the High Court’s fidelity.
As Part II discusses, the to-do in the United States over originalism is a 
temporally-sensitive feature of our politics, raging at opportune moments and 
fading away when no longer useful. The present moment arose in part because 
many of the politically salient opinions of the Warren and Burger Courts were 
individual-rights cases susceptible to critique on originalist grounds. It is difficult 
to imagine Justice Scalia and all he represents existing in the absence of 
, , , and like opinions. These opinions 
enable him, as Claudius enables Hamlet.
It is also difficult to imagine a comparable movement developing within a 
legal culture like Australia’s, whose Constitution lacks a bill of rights. Individual 
rights cases acquire a certain visibility that seems less likely to attach to disputes 
over, say, the vesting of state law jurisdiction in federal courts.338 Protection of 
individual social and political rights also enjoys an obvious compatibility with 
theories of constitutional evolution and stands in obvious tension—here, 
“incompatibility” would be too strong339—with a commitment to parliamentary 
supremacy. 
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Australia’s constitutional structure does not, then, encourage a rights 
revolution at all, much less an anti-rights backlash. It is nevertheless worth noting 
that the most prominent reaffirmations of Australian legalism arose in a posture of 
opposition. The was an effort by Justices Isaacs and Higgins to 
repudiate decisively the reserved state powers doctrine and the putatively loose 
interpretive principles that generated it. And most observers consider the Gleeson 
Court a deliberate foil for the perceived excesses of the Mason Court.
Canada’s rights revolution, on the other hand, is more than competitive 
with that of the Warren Court.340 Negative rights cases brought under the Charter 
had a 41 percent success rate from 1982 to 2002 and positive and group rights 
cases had a 27 percent success rate.341 And although there is evidence within the 
Canadian legal academy of nascent unease with living tree interpretation, there is 
nothing approaching a serious suggestion of originalism.342
There are at least three possible reasons for the relative lack of embrace of 
originalism by an anti-rights backlash movement in Canada. First, the Canadian 
experience with aggressive rights protection is more recent than that of the United 
States. It takes time for a political movement to mobilize, and it takes 
considerable effort and imagination for such a movement to mobilize around a set 
of interpretive principles.343 As Morton and Knopff write, “The Charter revolution 
has unfolded so quickly that it is hard to gain perspective on it.”344
It does not help that the Liberal Party, which unlike its Australian 
namesake is politically aligned with the U.S. Democratic Party, controlled the 
Canadian government and Canadian judicial appointments from 1993 to 2006, 
when many of the most controversial Charter opinions issued. This era of Liberal 
Party dominance both stocked the judicial bench with like-minded judges and 
may have sapped conservative politics of the intellectual vitality needed to 
coalesce around an effective foil to living tree interpretation. Consider also in this 
regard the availability of legislative override under section 33, which though 
rarely invoked removes a rhetorical arrow from the quiver of the Court’s 
opponents.
Second, much of Charter interpretation toils in the vast fields left open by 
section 1, the limitations clause.345 That section’s text refers to “such limitations 
as are justified in a free and democratic society,” not those that are, say, 
                                                  
340 Part III.A.2, .
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“consistent with our history and traditions.” An originalist construction of section 
1 would therefore be violently atextual.346 Third, as discussed, the Charter’s 
drafting history itself suggests an expectation of progressive interpretation.347
It bears mention, finally, that the anti-rights orientation of American 
originalism also relates significantly to its aggrandizement of the American 
Founding. A constitutional jurisprudence whose essential point of reference post-
dates World War II is more likely to view excessive positivism with suspicion.348
Proponents of that jurisprudence are also more likely to express discomfort with, 
and to be suspicious of, the perceived failure of American originalists to 
recognize the limitations of positivism confirmed by the European experience. 
Originalism is associated with the American right and with a constitutionalism 
that much of the world has no desire to emulate.349
The entry for —“to defame or vilify (a person) systematically, esp. 
in the mass media, usually with the aim of preventing his or her appointment to 
public office; to obstruct or thwart (a person) in this way”—first appeared in the 
Oxford English Dictionary in 2002.350 Robert Bork’s 1987 Supreme Court 
confirmation hearing was a media and interest-group frenzy the likes of which the 
United States had not known before but has known several times since. The ritual 
wherein Court nominees are meticulously demolished by partisans over several 
months, brought before television cameras to parry the stylized soliloquies of 
Judiciary Committee members, and condemned or praised by literally hundreds of 
interest groups is a familiar feature of our judicial politics.351 It has become 
typical for the public interrogation of a Supreme Court nominee to include 
extensive discussion of his or her “judicial philosophy.”352 Abetted by this 
                                                  
346 The test for whether a challenged statute passes muster under § 1 is provided in , 
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347 note 316 and accompanying text.
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process, constitutional methodology, and originalism in particular, has become a 
site for popular political mobilization.353
This rite is unknown to Canada or Australia. In neither country does the 
national Parliament have any formal role in the nomination of high court justices 
and in neither country has the nomination process been remotely as politicized as 
it is in the United States. By comparison to the United States, nominations are 
low-visibility events in both countries. Justices are selected by the ruling 
government against background norms of qualification for the position.354 Writes 
Peter Hogg of the situation in Canada, “[S]uccessive governments have evidently 
concluded that it is good politics to make good appointments, and the quality of 
appointments is generally agreed to be high. There has never been any serious 
suggestion that Canadian governments have attempted to ‘pack’ the court with 
judges of a particular approach or ideology.”355
There have been intermittent calls for a broader public discussion of 
Supreme Court nominees in Canada, and the 2006 appointment of Marshall 
Rothstein to the Court featured the first public interview process for a high court 
nominee in Canada. Even then, though, Justice Rothstein’s hearing before an ad 
hoc parliamentary committee was barely three hours long and betrayed not a hint 
of acrimony.356 The future of even this low level of public participation in the 
nomination process is unclear. When Justice Bastarache’s resignation created a 
vacancy on the Court in 2008, Prime Minister Harper unceremoniously selected 
Thomas Cromwell without adhering to the quasi-public process Harper himself 
had earlier endorsed.357 As one columnist writes, “[w]henever someone suggests 
that . . . we ought to have some kind of a public discussion about the kinds of 
views and philosophies we want on the bench, the idea is immediately batted 
down. Too American.”358
In Australia, too, there have long been calls to bring more “transparency” 
and “accountability” to the judicial nomination process, but even critics of the 
process concede that “governments have usually exercised this power with due 
                                                  
353 .; Post & Siegel, note 23, at 554. More than 400 interest groups weighed in on the 
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357 Philip Slayton, , MACLEAN’S, Feb. 2, 2009, at 20.
358 Anthony Keller, , GLOBE & MAIL , Dec. 1, 
1997, at A17; MOR TON & KNOPFF, note 135, at 17 n.22 (collecting sources 





See Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of 
Canada
See Ottawa’s Best-Kept Secret?
Wanted: A Public Word with the Would-be Judges
see also supra
Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.
64
care and regard for the Court, including that it be composed of the best legal talent 
and that it be able to maintain public confidence in the administration of 
justice.”359 The grass is always greener indeed.
I have argued elsewhere that the originalism movement is a populist one. 
It flaunts originalism’s elegance; the simplicity with which it may be explained to 
non-professional audiences; its neutering of the decisionmaking authority of legal 
elites; and its fundamentally nationalist orientation.360 In the United States, the 
judicial nomination process is the most prominent site at which that set of ethical 
values is transcribed onto judicial practice.361 Even if the same set of ethical 
values has purchase in Canada or Australia, the absence of public involvement in 
judicial selection deprives domestic politics of a prime opportunity to tie those 
values to originalism.
American originalism is radically jurispathic. The term is Robert Cover’s, 
and he used it to refer to the role of the court as a suppressant of law. Law in this 
sense is not, or rather is not only, the rules that the state is prepared to enforce 
through violence, but refers to a legal meaning particular to a community’s 
normative universe, or .362 Cover said that courts arise out of “the need to 
suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a 
hierarchy. It is the multiplicity of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative 
principle, that creates the problem to which the court and the state are the 
solution.”363
Constitutional interpretation, even as judicially enforced, can seek to 
preserve a space for multiple to coexist. Constitutional principles may be 
understood to have meanings that are not fixed in time but evolve through higher-
order social and political competition.364 Constitutional law as enforced by the 
state may be understood, then, as distinct from what the Constitution . In 
other work I have referred to this distinction as “thin” versus “thick” 
constitutional law: Because not all constitutional law is equally shared, not all 
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constitutional law is equally stable.365 A little instability in constitutional law 
preserves a space for competing constitutional narratives to breathe that sweet air 
of legitimacy.
Originalism generally rejects all I have just said. Indeed, it is chiefly 
promoted as the most effective means of establishing the falsity of competing 
narratives. Original understanding is a criterion for what the law that is thought 
to frustrate the social and political capture of judges. The chief lament of many of 
the Australian judges in Pierce’s study is telling: “[T]here was a certainty about 
law fifty years ago which most practitioners would tell you is now absent.” 
“There was a conscious jettisoning [by the Mason Court] of the notion that 
certainty is the object of the legal system.” “The High Court itself has been very 
active in recent years . . . some would say overactive to the extent there has been 
an element of instability infused in some areas of the law which is perhaps felt to 
be undesirable.”366 For law to hold out the possibility of capture is bound to create 
uncertainty and instability, but for many marginalized communities it is what 
makes the legal language game worth playing.367
A constitutional interpretive methodology designed to suppress competing 
narratives is a poor fit for Charter interpretation and for Canada’s national ethos 
more generally. In particular, accommodation of the interests of the Québécois 
was a precondition to federation and is expressed in numerous Charter provisions, 
and the ongoing tension surrounding Canada’s fundamental heterogeneity has 
produced several constitutional crises over the last three decades. The Charter 
itself guarantees a number of express rights to language minorities;368 guarantees 
the right to travel;369 protects the rights of aboriginal peoples, including treaty 
rights;370 grants rights to sectarian schools;371 and requires that the Charter “be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians.”372 The very existence of the federal 
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Department of Canadian Heritage suggests a certain insecurity about Canada’s 
cultural unity, and as to assuage any suggested affinity for hegemony, the 
Department states its “strategic outcomes” in full as “Canadians express and share 
their diverse cultural experiences with each other and the world,” and “Canadians 
live in an inclusive society built on intercultural understanding and citizen 
participation.”373 Québec in fact still has not ratified the Charter, and efforts to 
institute reforms that would bring Québec fully into the national fold have 
failed.374 Canadians have never quite been one people, and the Charter has not 
succeeded in its lofty though necessarily half-hearted ambition to make them 
so.375
To be sure, the same could be said of Americans, but not so fast. The 
United States has no significant separatist movement, its aboriginal population is 
much smaller than Canada’s,376 and its minority populations are, ironically 
perhaps, insufficiently insular to enjoy political power comparable to that of the 
Québécois.377 It is easier for an assimilationist ethic to flourish in the United 
States—or in Australia, for that matter378—than in Canada. Public values surveys 
conducted by the research firm Environics throughout the 1990s show the number 
of Canadians who said they “relate to nonconformists” remaining consistently at 
two-thirds, but the number of Americans who said the same dropping from 64 
percent in 1992 to 52 percent in 2000.379 During the same period, the number of 
Canadians agreeing that “[n]on-whites should not be allowed to immigrate to this 
country” rose from 11 percent to 13 percent, while in the United States it rose 
from 16 percent to 25 percent.380
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The U.S. Constitution is an important conduit for American assimilation: 
the dominant domestic narrative, part of the legacy of 
, remains that separate is inherently unequal.381 But the ethic extends 
beyond race. Justice Scalia is conspicuously fond of relying upon it in 
constitutional cases. His spirited dissent in the case quoted approvingly the 
school’s Code of a Gentleman and praised the “manly ‘honor’” the school 
instilled in students through its single-sex, military-style indoctrination.382 In a 
recent case considering whether the Ten Commandments could be posted in a 
courthouse, Justice Scalia suggested that public acknowledgement of the Ten 
Commandments is distinguishable from government endorsement of religion on 
the grounds, in part, that 97.7 percent of Americans practice monotheistic 
faiths.383 It was the very commitment to equality as against appreciation of 
difference that Justice Scalia cited in rejecting the claim of a Native American to 
constitutional protection of his peyote use in .384
Consider also Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
, in which the Court refused to extend visitation rights to the biological father of 
a child born to a woman married to another man.385 Justice Scalia denied the 
claim to constitutional protection of the out-of-wedlock relationship between the 
petitioner and the mother in part on the ground that it has not “been treated as a 
protected family unit under the historical practices of our society.”386 Criticizing 
Justice Scalia’s reliance on tradition, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent:
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to 
those interests specifically protected by historical practice, . . . the 
plurality ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists. We 
are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic 
one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or 
even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own 
idiosyncracies.387
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Justice Brennan identified a set of fault lines often neglected in interpretive 
debates. Originalists tend to disfavor particularized claims of right and seek to 
conform our constitutional history to that posture.
The living tree metaphor is not unique to Canadian law. Elliot Dorf and 
Arthur Rosett have emphasized that Jewish law is distinct from biblical law 
insofar as, although based on the Bible, it has evolved “through interpretation, 
legislation, and custom.”388 They write: “The rabbis of the classical tradition 
claimed that their interpretations were the new form of God’s revelation, 
replacing visions and voices. Those features of Jewish law proclaim loudly that it 
is intended to be a law for all generations, and so Jews have lived it.”389 It is in 
part for this reason that Jewish law has been compared within that classical 
tradition to a “living tree.”390 The analogy derives from the Book of Proverbs:
I give you good instruction; never forsake My Torah.
It is a tree of life, for those who hold fast to it, and those who uphold
it are happy.
Its ways are pleasant, and all its paths are peace.391
As we have seen, the dichotomy between revelation and interpretation recurs in 
debates over the authority of statutory and constitutional text as originally enacted 
and understood. Justice Kirby equates British statutory interpretation with the 
notion that judges “had to find their authority in a text of the law, just as the new 
bishops after the Reformation were expected to find theirs in the text of 
Scripture.”392 It was not only “very English” but “very Protestant” to “demand 
fidelity to the text so as to curb the inventions and pretensions to unwarranted 
power.”393
As Jaroslav Pelikan notes in his insightful comparison of biblical and 
constitutional interpretation, the first of Martin Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses—
“Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, when He said , willed that 
the whole life of believers should be repentance”394—is no less than “an appeal 
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from the current teaching and practice of the church to the original intent and 
of the Gospels.”395 The point here is that the “original, 
grammatical meaning of the Scripture” commands a devotion to a life of 
repentance, not the performance of penance, or “the ritual of contrition, 
confession, and satisfaction” commanded by the Roman Catholic Church. Luther 
was appealing to the original meaning of the text rather than the scriptural 
decision rule crafted by the Church.396
There are numerous reasons to think this dichotomy liable to concretize 
within the American imagination. The American attitude toward the Constitution 
is frequently described in terms of worship, reverence, and fidelity.397 Max Lerner 
once described the Constitution as America’s “totem and its fetish.” He wrote:
In fact the very habits of mind begotten by an authoritarian Bible 
and a religion of submission to a higher power have been carried over to 
an authoritarian Constitution and a philosophy of submission to a “higher 
law;” and a country like America, in which its early tradition had 
prohibited a state church, ends by getting a state church after all, although 
in a secular form.398
On this conception the difficulty of constitutional amendment through Article V, 
which could theoretically argue in favor of evolutionary interpretation by judges, 
instead facilitates the iconography of the Constitution as a sacred text. What 
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Ackerman calls constitutional moments Scalia might call apocrypha, as far as 
their authority over him extends. Add to this broth the evangelical movement, 
which generally favors literal interpretation of the Bible—that is, according to the 
author’s original semantic intention399—and which is, relatedly or not, suspicious 
of metaphors of evolution, and the relative popularity of originalism in the United 
States begins to look less mysterious.400
Consider the religious makeup of each of the countries we have studied. 
Roughly half of all Americans self-identify as Protestant, roughly half of that 
number self-identifies as evangelical Protestant, and roughly four in ten 
Americans say they attend church weekly.401 Half of American evangelicals—the 
most of any religious group surveyed—believe that there is “only one true way to 
interpret the teachings of my religion.”402 Evangelicalism is far less prevalent in 
Canada and Australia. Less than a quarter of the population of either country is 
Protestant, only eight percent of Canadians identify as evangelical, and more than 
15 percent of the population of each country has no religious belief at all.403 By 
contrast only five percent of U.S. adults report that they are atheist or agnostic.404
Although both Canada and Australia have larger Roman Catholic populations 
than the United States, Catholic biblical interpretation is traditionally eclectic and 
purposive rather than dogmatic and strictly textualist.405
Restoration and redemption are, as Jack Balkin writes, “the key tropes of 
constitutional interpretation by social movements and political parties.”406
Successful claims on the meaning of the Constitution call for either a “return to 
the enduring principles of the Constitution” or “fulfillment of those principles.”407
As a traditionally restorative modality, originalism might be viewed as a secular 
corollary to “the fall” in Christian theology. In the originalist narrative the 
                                                  
399 J.I. Packer, , MISSION & MINISTR Y, Jan. 1, 2000.
400 A recent MIT public opinion survey finds a statistically significant correlation between 
Americans’ approval of originalism and their belief in the literal truth of the Bible. Attitudes 
& Perceptions About the Constitution (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2009) (data on file 
with the author).
401 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious 
Composition of the U.S., http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/affiliations-all-traditions.pdf.
402 . By comparison, only one in ten American Jews holds this view. .
403 Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/as.html (Austl.), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ca.html (Can.).
404 . at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html.
405 Pontifical Biblical Commission, Interpretation of the Bible (1994); PELIK AN, note 
395, at 56-57; Powell, note 317, at 889-94 (describing the intellectual origins 
of revolutionary American ideas about interpretation within British Protestantism and its 
opposition to papal corruption of Biblical authority).
406 Balkin, note 18, at 301.
407 .









Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, forthcoming 88 Tex. L. Rev.
71
founding era is a prelapsarian state, a pure source of constitutional meaning and 
legal authority. Originalism promises a return to this state and a cleansing of the 
corrupting influence of unelected judges over constitutional law.408
* * *
The six hypotheses just sketched are interrelated. One could as easily state 
them as a single hypothesis with multiple elements: The United States is a country 
with a large evangelical population and in which much of the population holds a 
reverential attitude toward the Constitution and toward the war heroes who forged 
it. That Constitution is a source of political identity for many Americans, and as a 
symbol of American sovereignty it is a potent reference for narratives of 
restoration and redemption.409 The rights revolution of the Warren and Burger 
Courts led to a conservative backlash that, owing in part to the public nature of 
the judicial nomination process, was able to frame its critique through the medium 
of constitutional interpretive methodology. Thus a particular orientation combined 
with a particular objective and an opportunity to create an originalism 
“movement” that has no parallel in either Canada or Australia.
The direction of causation in this story is concededly enigmatic. Sustained 
glorification of originalist interpretive methods might well have backwash effects 
that serve to reinforce our reverence for the founding generation or even perhaps 
our affinity for literalism in biblical exegesis. I do not, moreover, wish to 
minimize the significance and the agency of a motivated social and political 
movement in the proliferation of originalism in the United States. I may have  
identified factors that have led us to the waters of originalism, but only a 
committed movement can force us to drink. 
What I do wish to deny is that the failure of originalism to spread to 
Canada, or of more historicist originalism to spread to Australia, is or can be 
attributed to simple lack of effort or internal persuasiveness. Originalism and 
historicism are socially embedded and culturally contingent.410 Their success 
requires not just an argument, or even one coupled with a movement, but also an 
audience sensitized by culture and by history.
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When Justice Hugo Black delivered the inaugural James Madison lectures 
at New York University School of Law in 1960, he began his speech by 
recounting Madison’s role in the founding of the nation. Madison, he said, “lived 
in the stirring times between 1750 and 1836, during which the Colonies declared, 
fought for, and won their independence from England.” Black said that the 
government those colonists set up was “dedicated to Liberty and Justice,” and 
said that because of Madison’s outsized role as “the Father of our Constitution,” 
his words “are an authentic source to help us understand the Constitution and its 
Bill of Rights.”411
In the lecture that followed that eulogistic introduction, Black offered his 
well-known theory on the first ten amendments to the Constitution, that “there 
‘absolutes’ in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men 
who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be ‘absolutes.’”412
As Charles Black has observed, it seems that Justice Black cannot have meant 
what he said.413 It cannot be that Congress truly can make law abridging the 
freedom of speech, and Justice Black, a deceptively learned man, must have 
known that. Professor Black seeks to rescue his eponymous contemporary with 
something of a lawyer’s trick: even on Justice Black’s view, freedom of speech 
remains to be defined, and the same sort of balancing Justice Black criticizes in 
his opponents he himself may employ in deciding in the first instance what that 
freedom entails.414 The difference, then, between Justice Black and his 
adversaries is not in their relative commitments to the Constitution but in what 
Professor Black calls “attitude.”415 A posture of absolutism is a prophylaxis 
against dilution of our constitutional rights.
In Justice Black’s hands, originalist argument was, , an 
argument about the sort of attitude judges should take toward the Constitution. 
For Justice Black, that attitude was deeply informed by the lessons of American 
history. In the Madison lectures he articulated his own version of the fall:
Today most Americans seem to have forgotten the ancient evils 
which forced their ancestors to flee to this new country and to form a 
government stripped of old powers used to oppress them. But the 
Americans who supported the Revolution and the adoption of our 
Constitution knew firsthand the dangers of tyrannical governments. They 
were familiar with the long existing practice of English persecutions of 
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people wholly because of their religious or political beliefs. They knew 
that many accused of such offenses had stood, helpless to defend 
themselves, before biased legislators and judges.416
Black is storytelling. He is using anecdote to evoke feelings of nostalgia, 
patriotism, and pride in favor of an attitude of caution and prophylaxis toward 
judicial authority to determine the scope of constitutional rights. This way of 
arguing about methodology is available to him because of the passage of time and 
the historical and cultural moment the Revolution represents in the American 
imagination. Writing at the height of the Cold War and less than a generation 
removed from World War II, Black’s narrative is less populist than Justice 
Scalia’s—it instead is anti-statist, rights-friendly, less suspicious of difference, 
and focused on concepts like liberty and justice—but it is no less American.
Constitutional theory has a name for this style of argument, and it isn’t 
originalism. In 1982 Philip Bobbitt articulated a typology of constitutional 
argument that has become familiar to legal academics. Bobbitt divided 
constitutional argument into six modalities: historical, textual, structural, 
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical.417 Originalism is typically associated with his 
first kind of argument, historical, but this Article suggests that it is also associated 
with his last kind, ethical. Ethical argument represents “constitutional argument 
whose force relies on a characterization of American institutions and the role 
within them of the American people.” On Bobbitt’s account, such arguments 
advance “the character, or , of the American polity” as legal authority.418
Bobbitt concluded that a surprising range of decisions employ primarily ethical 
argument—from the to to the 
, among others.419
More interestingly for our purposes, Bobbitt also seemed to recognize 
implicitly that historical argument is, in important ways, ethical. In critiquing an 
originalist position, Bobbitt relied on the familiar argument that it is difficult to 
imagine what members of the founding generation would have thought about how 
to apply the general principles of the Constitution to modern issues. Such 
imagining, he says:
depends also on assumptions about intention, but in a peculiar 
way: that the whole life of an eighteenth-century agrarian society should 
govern us since the Founders were of that special day and that we, from 
our very different lives, can know what those people would have thought 
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in situations within which they would have been, of course, very different 
people. It is easy to see that such arguments are better for dissent than for 
the Court because . . . they express a particular moral point and are 
therefore more effective as rhetoric than as decision procedure.420
Though Bobbitt does not say so, he is describing a form of ethical argument. The 
rhetoric upon which originalist arguments rely, often successfully, is driven by a
narrative about the American ethos.421 Originalist arguments help to construct and 
then embed themselves within “the community’s self-conception of its values and 
commitments, and the stories that it tells about itself to itself.”422 Much more than 
textual, structural, doctrinal, or prudential argument, historical argument in the 
United States is about storytelling.
That was difficult to recognize—if it was true at all—before historical 
argument in the United States became so self-referential. As Bork and Scalia have 
noted, there was a time when it was unusual for American judges to suggest any 
alternative to originalism.423 But in the great battles between Black and 
Frankfurter and Breyer and Scalia, the originalist position has indeed become as 
much “rhetoric as decision procedure.” When multiple modalities are made 
available and become the subject of judicial discussion, there develop conventions 
for choosing among them. Put differently, there are modalities for choosing 
modalities.
The scope of conventional argument about modality is easier to see in 
Canada and Australia, the high courts of which are more self-conscious about 
interpretation than is our own. The argument for living tree interpretation in 
Canada is partly doctrinal, relying expressly on the . One could 
advance a persuasive textual argument that the Supreme Court of Canada should 
interpret section 1 of the Charter through an evolutionary modality. The argument 
for legalism in Australia was doctrinal prior to the Mason Court, based on the 
, but under the Gleeson Court it was perhaps better characterized 
as prudential, designed to impart needed certainty upon judicial decisionmaking. 
The practice of constitutional law is the practice of making a set of arguments, but 
it is as much the practice of arguing about how to choose among those arguments.
Recognizing that originalist argument in the United States is ultimately 
ethical should give pause both to originalists and to their detractors. For some 
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originalists, the recognition is self-defeating. Originalism is valuable to many 
originalists precisely because its source of legal authority is not 
contested. Ethical argument is an ideological approach to interpretation, not in the 
sense that it is partisan, but in the sense that it is socially constructed; originalists 
generally reject ideological approaches in either sense. The narratives originalists 
rely upon are imagined to emerge from analysis rather than advocacy.424 But if the 
choice of a historical modality is culturally dependent, conventional legal analysis 
cannot be authoritative on its own; it must always be connected to a story about 
what kind of people we are.
Nonoriginalists have been on the defensive of late. This Article’s 
observations are reason for optimism and caution alike. Recall, from Part IV, the 
framing of originalism’s template in terms of three “o’s”: orientation, objective, 
and opportunity.425 It will be fruitful to discuss them in reverse. The opportunity 
for political progressives to construct an alternative program framed in 
methodological terms is riper than it has been in some time. Barack Obama was 
elected with a larger popular vote share than any first-term Democrat since 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, and he began his presidency with large 
majorities in both houses of Congress. The judicial nomination process remains 
vulnerable to populist appeals, but in an era of deep economic uncertainty it is far 
from clear that such appeals still align comfortably with conservative politics.
The notes of caution relate to the other two “o’s”: objective and 
orientation. The originalism movement is connected to a set of political 
commitments. We need not guess at what those commitments are. The Reagan 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy produced a document in 1988 
entitled “The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional 
Interpretation.” The document proclaimed itself designed to identify the stakes of 
the “judicial philosophies” of the judges appointed to the Supreme Court. The 
claimed results dictated by an originalist view of the Constitution aligned nicely 
with the Republican political program of the 1980s: restrictions on abortion rights, 
gay rights, immigrant rights, and affirmative action, and protections for private 
discrimination, school prayer, state autonomy, and property rights.426 We can now 
add gun rights to that program, although resurrection of the Second Amendment 
was not a mainstream view in the 1980s.427 Originalism does not obviously 
produce some of those positions—restrictions on affirmative action, for 
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example—but originalism was a means of casting many of them in putatively 
neutral terms and therefore branding the agenda as a whole as consistent with 
constitutional fidelity.428 No similarly coherent political program has emerged 
from the left. It will be difficult for progressives to formulate an effective 
response to originalism without reaching general consensus on a policy agenda 
that the response is designed to promote.
More attention will have to be paid, moreover, to the first “o,” orientation. 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that originalism is attractive to many 
Americans in part because of our orientation toward the founding generation, 
toward assimilation and individualized claims of right, and toward secular 
approaches to interpretation of sacred texts. These orientations are slow to evolve, 
and seem to accommodate originalism better than some of its more dynamic 
competitors. As I have emphasized, however, orientations lie dormant without a 
corresponding narrative, and the narratives that connect us to these originalism-
friendly orientations are contestable.
Significantly, the American polity may be increasingly susceptible to a 
pluralist narrative. If current immigration and demographic patterns hold, the U.S. 
Census Bureau projects that the United States will be majority-minority by the 
year 2042.429 As the nation diversifies culturally, narratives of assimilation may 
become less fecund and the unifying potential of founding era mythology may 
diminish. The symbolism of that era may not resonate equally across a range of 
communities, and to the extent that it does resonate, it may do so increasingly as a 
source of redemption rather than restoration. Claims that extend beyond equal 
status to equal respect or even affirmative appreciation of difference may become 
more prevalent and politically powerful.430
Technological change, which allows communities of interest to form 
across geographic space, also may facilitate a relative shift in favor of pluralist
narratives. Immigrant rights, rights for gay, lesbian, and transgendered 
individuals, rights for the disabled, and less punitive approaches to criminal 
behavior might all benefit from a renewed emphasis on the American orientation 
towards accommodation of difference.431 Jurispathic certitude in law may become 
relatively disfavored as a result; the most potent constitutional metaphor may 
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trend away from the tablets of the covenant and toward, say, open-source 
software.
A second possibility is that the financial crisis of 2008 could, with 
sufficient emphasis, prompt a revitalization of a welfare-oriented 
constitutionalism.432 Comparisons between Obama and Roosevelt should not be 
lost on those who seek to shift the focus of originalism away from the founding 
generation, for the appropriate era to mine for inspiration may be the New Deal 
rather than Reconstruction.433 Freedom from want remains the most neglected of 
Roosevelt’s four freedoms; the time may be ripe to resurrect Roosevelt’s Second 
Bill of Rights, which called for a fierce political commitment to a living wage, 
freedom from unfair competition, home ownership, health care, education, and 
recreation. That is a remarkably plausible progressive policy platform for the 
current time. It is, moreover, a platform easily adaptable to representation 
reinforcement, to the Reconstruction-oriented originalism of Justice Black, or 
even, in this Democratic era, to a minimalist or prudentialist approach to 
constitutional interpretation. What is needed are storytellers; simply mouthing the 
words “living this” or “living that” will not do. Too Canadian.
Originalism, like any other species of legal practice, is environmentally 
adaptive. The variations in practices of constitutional interpretation that we 
observe across space and time may be explained by variations in the political, 
cultural, and historical landscape in which those practices are situated. That may 
seem obvious, but it is in tension with the view that originalism follows inevitably 
from the act of judicial interpretation of a written constitution. I hope to have 
demonstrated not only that that view is unlikely to be true but also that a long 
tradition of judicial review, difficulty of constitutional amendment, a familiarity 
with common law adjudication, and a desire to avoid judicial activism do not add 
up to an affinity for originalism. We share those conditions with Canada and with 
Australia, and in both countries the sorts of interpretive moves that enjoy 
rhetorical potency are quite different from here. That is not for lack of exposure to 
the originalist argument as it has been expressed in the United States; rather, it 
results, I suggest, from a different historical orientation toward the Constitution, a 
different place in domestic political time, a different approach to judicial 
selection, and a different set of cultural and religious predicates.
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In exposing these variations in practice and proposing a set of explanatory 
influences I hope not only to have demystified originalism but also to have 
gestured at a different frame of mind in constitutional interpretive discourse. 
Originalism has been relatively successful in the United States because its 
proponents have related it to an account of constitutional authority that resonates 
with the American people. It has not been successful in Canada because no 
comparable narrative is available. It has taken a different form in Australia 
because Australians necessarily tell a different set of stories about their 
constitutional history and the role of the judiciary in enforcing constitutional 
mandates. Interpretive constitutional arguments, like substantive ones, are 
arguments about democratic culture. The effectiveness of arguments for or against 
one or another method of interpretation will depend not on whether the arguments 
are logically coherent but on whether they are ours.
